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THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY?
Linda C. McClain*
I. OVERVIEW
This Article has two aims. First, it defends a continuing role for the
right of privacy in arguments -for women's reproductive freedom against
charges that privacy is an impoverished concept. Second, it raises cautions
about certain feminist critiques of privacy that would ground this freedom
in notions of reproductive responsibilities. As this Article was first presented at a conference, "Reproductive Issues in a Post-Roe' World," held
in the wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 the first question
is: Are we now, given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,' in a "post-Roe world"? Furthermore, what remains
of the right of privacy?
The initial reactions to Casey among persons who support women's
reproductive choice have run the gamut from interpreting the decision as
signaling that Roe v. Wade is "dead" 4 to receiving it with a combination
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' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2
492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Webster plurality's intimations that it would overrule
Roe and its invitation to state legislatures to regulate abortion prior to viability subject
only to a rational relationship standard of constitutional review gave reason to fear for
the future of Roe, and therefore for women's reproductive freedom. Id. at 537-38
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey contains five opinions: a joint opinion by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, and four separate opinions concurring in part
and dissenting in part by Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun, Chief Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas), and Justice Scalia (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas).
4 Patricia Ireland, President of NOW, reportedly stated: "Roe is dead, despite the
flimsy stay of execution issued today by the Court." Abortion Angst, Newsweek, July
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of relief and dread. Relief,5 because Casey on its face claims that "the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed." 6 Arguably, Casey offers a fuller explication of the constitutional bases for women's reproductive liberty than did prior decisions,
including Roe, although the word "privacy" all but disappears from the
joint opinion's account. Dread, because, after all, the Court upheld all but
one of the restrictive provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act at
issue. 7 There is reason to believe that some of these restrictions will in
practice pose substantial obstacles for many women seeking abortions,
particularly poor women, many of them women of color, and rural
women.8 Further, as Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion cautions, only
one vote separates Casey's official upholding of Roe from an outright
overruling of Roe, 9 highlighting the critical importance of the Supreme
Court nomination process, the outcome of federal elections, and the
proposed Freedom of Choice Act."

13, 1992, at 16. Two days after the Casey decision, Planned Parenthood of New York
City ran a full page newspaper advertisement stating: "Don't be fooled. Roe v. Wade
is dead." N.Y. Times, July 1, 1992, at A17.
' For reactions of relief, see, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, A Victory for Roe, N.Y.

Times, June 30, 1992, at A23; Laurence Tribe, News Conference with The National
Commission on America Without Roe (July 1, 1992), available in WESTLAW, Fed.
News Serv. For suggestions that Casey strengthened Roe's justification of reproductive
autonomy, see Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds!, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 13, 1992,
at 30; Tony Mauro, Future of Roe Hangs by One Vote, U.S.A. Today, June 30, 1992,
at Al (quoting Laurence Tribe).
6 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2804. That portion of the joint opinion, parts I to III, was
joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, making the decision a five-four reaffirmation
of Roe.
7 See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2803, 2833. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's
upholding of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3205
(informed consent and waiting period); 3206 (informed consent of parent of minor, with
judicial bypass); 3203 (medical emergency exemption); and 3207(b), 3214(a), and
3214(f) (reporting requirements). The Court, like the Third Circuit, held § 3209
(husband notification requirement) unconstitutional.
See The Women with Undue Burdens, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1991, at A18;
8
Dorothy E. Roberts, Casey and Rust: America's Two Abortion Laws, N.J. L.J., July
27, 1992, at 18.
9 The four member dissent in Casey would have overruled Roe and henceforth
applied Webster's mere rational relationship analysis. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
10 See Anna Quindlen, One Vote, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1992, at A23. The
Freedom of Choice Act, S.25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (July 17, 1992 version),
is intended to secure, by federal statute, the limits on state power to restrict women's
freedom to terminate a pregnancy that were recognized in Roe v. Wade but that have
been eroded by subsequent decisions and statutes. That Act provides in relevant part:
Section 2. Right to Choose.
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In part II, this Article will consider the usefulness of privacy in
protecting women's reproductive freedom, not in a "post-Roe world," but
in a world of a "revised Roe"-in which the Court's reading of the
"essential holding of Roe" combines stirring and, I hope, sincere rhetoric
about women's liberty with obvious sympathy and wide latitude for state
restrictions motivated by the state's interest in protecting potential life.
Anyone defending the right of privacy after Webster and Casey must take
up the challenge of claiming that the full promise of privacy has been
unrealized, not because of the poverty of the concept, but because of a
failure to take privacy seriously. Properly understood and fully utilized, the
right of privacy can aid in protecting women's autonomy and liberty of
conscience with respect to reproduction and sexuality."
The lack of full constitutional protection for women's reproductive
freedom has led many feminists to fault the right of privacy and to proffer
alternative bases, particularly sex equality arguments. There are many
persuasive arguments for a sex equality analysis-indeed, portions of the
Casey opinions indicate recognition of that dimension of the abortion
issue.'2 This Article, while defending privacy, does not take up the
"privacy versus equality" challenge, 3 since any principled argument that
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subsection (b), a State may not

restrict the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy(1) before fetal viability; or
(2) at any time, if such termination is necessary to protect the life or health
of the woman.
(b) MEDICALLY NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS.-A State may impose
requirements medically necessary to protect the life or health of women
referred to in subsection (a).
The November 1992 federal electibns took place after this Article was substantially
completed and shortly before it went to press. The landscape will undoubtedly change

as a result of the election of Bill Clinton and a number of "pro-choice" congressional
candidates. During his campaign and since his election, President-elect Clinton has
publicly expressed a "pro-choice" stance and has indicated that he supports the
proposed Freedom of Choice Act, intends to change by executive order a number of
federal policies restricting access to abortion and abortion counseling, would not veto
congressional action overturning restrictions on public funding of abortion (regarding
such restrictions, see infra text accompanying notes 86-96), and is committed to
working toward eliminating the need for abortion. See Philip J. Hilts, Clinton and
Abortion: Limited Expectations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1992, at A44.
" This Article does not address the way in which privacy jurisprudence has
distinguished between adult women and female minors with respect to reproductive
decisions. Serious issues arise from tensions between constitutional protection of
individual privacy and family privacy that are outside the scope of this Article. See
infra note 52.
2 See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-12, 2829-31 (joint opinion); 2838
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
13 For the source of the formulation quoted in the text and for a critique of the
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may help safeguard women's freedom should be advanced, nor does this
Article address every criticism levelled at privacy.
Instead, in part III, this Article will consider certain feminist criticisms
that attribute the failure of privacy to secure reproductive freedom to
privacy's rights-based approach. The authors of these critiques argue that
privacy is an impoverished notion because it derives from or supports an
atomistic view of human beings incompatible with feminist goals (and many
women's actual experience) of connection and interdependency.' 4 Such
feminists argue that a more apt description of women's reproductive lives,
and a more persuasive argument, would speak not of rights and privacy, but
of responsibilities and connection."5 This Article takes the position that
such critiques offer an impoverished picture of privacy and argues that two
proffered alternatives, Ruth Colker's notion of good faith feminist argument
that is pro-woman rather than pro-choice and that acknowledges women as
having interconnected responsibilities, 6 and Robin West's responsibilitybased justification involving public-regarding arguments,17 would inadequately protect women's reproductive freedom.
Particularly in a world of a revised Roe, responsibility-based justifications of women's reproductive freedom that would seek to prove that

privacy rationale for failing to recognize the conditions of gender inequality in which
pregnancy takes place, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe
v. Wade, in Feminism Unmodified 93-102 (1987).
'" To put the point dramatically, by "atomistic man" and "atomism," I mean to
connote a picture of a disembodied individual, an unencumbered self, protected legally
by rights shielding him from community scrutiny and permitting him to pursue his selfinterest with no thought of responsibility to others. See Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic
Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1171, 1177-80 (1992).
S I have elsewhere written about the abortion issue in the context of assessing the
atomism critique of liberal jurisprudence and certain feminist alternative visions of
connection and care as a basis for legal analysis and standards. See id. at 1242-62.
Two of the papers presented at the Workshop at which this paper was originally
presented contain elements of the atomism critique and advance alternatives similar to
those I critique herein. See Sarah Harding, Equality and Abortion: Legitimating
Women's Experiences, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. 7 (1992); Julie Mertus, Beyond the
Solitary Self: Voice, Community, and Reproductive Freedom, 3 Colum. J. Gender &
L. 251 (1992).
16 See Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs
Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 Harv. Women's L.J.
137, 161-68 (1990) [hereinafter Colker, Feminist Litigation]. For further elaboration,
see Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and
Wisdom, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (1989) [hereinafter Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Abortion]. Colker also advances an equal protection argument, which I do not assess.
See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
17 See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 43,
79-85 (1990).
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women deserve such freedom, either because they value life (Colker) or
because they make decisions responsibly (West), raise a number of dangers.
The problems are particularly acute as women turn to federal and state
legislatures in addition to, if not instead of, the federal courts, to protect
such freedom. As a theoretical matter, the descriptions given of women's
moral experience risk essentializing all women and reinforcing stereotypes
of the feminine. 8 As a practical and strategic matter, advocacy of a
societal focus on the moral quality of women's decision making, even if
intended to promote empathy or understanding of women's conflicting
responsibilities, seems to invite societal second-guessing of women's
decisions-an invitation even easier to accept given the apparent disappearance of privacy in Casey.
Moreover, advocates of "responsibility talk" instead of "rights talk"' 9
about abortion need to consider how such talk may fare in a context in
which themes of responsibility and irresponsibility play a prominent role in
rhetoric opposing reproductive choice and in which there is growing interest
in political and other circles in addressing societal ills through encouraging
personal and social responsibility.2' Any proposals under which women
secure reproductive freedom because society believes it is "deserved" must
take seriously the often contradictory messages about responsible and
irresponsible reproduction. Because the work of Colker and West has some
similarities to that of feminists of many different theoretical viewpoints who
are working to develop descriptively accurate and persuasive arguments,
part IV of this Article extends a more general caution about such rhetoric
and a plea for the persuasive appeal of privacy.
When the feminist critics of privacy discussed herein talk about
responsibility, one of their primary aims is, in fact, to secure autonomy and
liberty of conscience. A better approach is to protect women's decision
making about reproduction as falling within the autonomy and liberty of
conscience shielded from majoritarian control through the right of privacy. 2' Providing such a shield is a central purpose of the pending
18 By "essentializing," I mean representing a particular account of women's
experience as adequate for women generally. See Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential
Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought ix-x (1988); Angela P. Harris,

Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585-86 (1990).
19 Cf. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political

Discourse (1991) (arguing that responsibility is missing from American discourse about
rights).
20 Such terms as responsibility and irresponsibility have contradictory and indeter-

minate content. A full treatment of this theme awaits elaboration elsewhere. See Linda
C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility (December 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
21 1 acknowledge that there are women actively opposing legal abortion who would
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congressional initiative to "codify Roe" through the Freedom of Choice Act
and of similar state initiatives.22 While feminists often argue that the
personal is political, and question the public/private dichotomy, women's
decision making about reproduction should not be subject to public approval
or second-guessing.' Therein lies the danger stemming from the apparent
disappearance of privacy from the joint opinion in Casey, even if Casey's
rationale for the ultimate decision being the woman's rather than the state's
is more thoroughly articulated than Roe's.

II. IN DEFENSE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Decisional Privacy and Liberty of Conscience: From
Roe to Casey
1. The Privacy Justification
The privacy justification of women's reproductive freedom is grounded
in the constitutional right to privacy with respect to the prerequisites of an
individual's personhood, encompassing such notions as autonomy, liberty
of conscience, self-determination, and individual identity.24 Such a
reading of privacy is well established, although not uncontroversial.
Privacy so understood has been embraced by some feminists as having
considerable potential for women;' undeniably, it has played a key role

disagree that such autonomy is desirable or in the best interests of women. See Faye
D. Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community
172-97 (1989) (viewing "current abortion controversy as the most recent expression of
a two-hundred-year tradition of female reform movements engaged in defending what
activists consider to be the best interests of women").
22 See supra note 10; infra note 260 and accompanying text.
23 See Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13
Harv. Women's L.J. 189, 193 (1990).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 38-56 for discussion of specific cases. On
the line of cases associated with the right of privacy and the debate over substantive due
process, see generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 15-1 to -21
(2d ed. 1988). Legal commentators have described the personhood interpretation as the
most prevalent interpretation of privacy. See id. §§ 15-1 to -3. But see Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989) (critiquing personhood thesis as
inadequate); Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican
Approaches to Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 861 (1991) (same).
25 See Anita L. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society 180
(1988) ("The central normative message of this book has been that women in the United
States must have significant opportunities for individual forms of personal privacy and
private choice. These opportunities enhance traits associated with moral personhood.").

19921

The Poverty of Privacy?

from the outset in the struggle for reproductive freedom.
The right of privacy has significance not simply for a person's interest
in avoiding disclosure of information about oneself or one's personal
matters, but also for the types of self-constituting decisions and activities
that make a person who she or he is.26 Both informational and decisional
privacy coneerns are present in the context of the abortion decision. To be
sure, one might say that women do not realize their identity by choosing
abortion in and of itself in the way that they do, for instance, by choosing
certain religious or intimate associations. Rather, state abortion regulations
denying women autonomy with respect to their reproductive lives either
induce women to seek illegal abortions or compel childbearing and, as a
practical matter, childrearing.27 Anita Allen argues that while decisional
privacy tends to be the exclusive focus of privacy analysis of contraception
and abortion, also at stake in reproductive matters are what she calls such
"paradigmatic" forms of privacy as "privacy at home" or a woman's need
for solitude and seclusion; indeed, motherhood and family life often involve
a sacrifice of such forms of privacy.'
Protecting decisional privacy as a constitutional matter by recourse to
notions of personhood and self-determination does not mean that as a
descriptive matter the reproductive choices of particular women are
autonomous in the sense of being unburdened by circumstance and
constraint. (Indeed, the story of "Jane Roe" was such a story, however
little of that story survives in the Roe opinion.29 ) Yet, while recognizing
26 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (upholding reporting
requirement for prescription of certain drugs while explaining that right to privacy
embraces both (1) an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure in personal matters,"
and (2) an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions");
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of hospital rule forbidding

husband's presence in delivery room while explicating same conception of privacy).
Justice Stevens, whose privacy jurisprudence I explore infra at text accompanying notes
49-50, authored the majority opinions in both Whalen and, prior to his elevation to the
Supreme Court, Fitzgerald. His opinion in Casey combines privacy concerns with sex
equality concerns.
27 See Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 788. Reva Siegel argues that as a matter of
"actual social practice," even if not legally compelled to raise children they bear,
women generally do so, and thus, as a practical matter, forced childrearing follows
forced childbearing. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 261, 371-72 (1992).

28 See Allen, supra note 25, at 83-97, 122; cf. Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's
Own (1929). I have elsewhere explored what Carol Gilligan calls the equation of
female-provided care (particularly by mothers) with self-sacrifice. See McClain, supra
note 14, at 1196-1203.
29 Compare Brief for Appellants at 9, 73, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No.
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the interplay of choice and constraint, it is important not to abandon the
affirmative case for the link between reproductive control and personal
destiny nor to underestimate the persuasive force of the appeal to rights of
autonomy as linked to personhood. In fact, the joint opinion in Casey
speaks of women's protected right to decide (largely) for themselves the
meaning of reproduction in their lives and links reproductive choice to
equality: "the ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives." ' 3 In explaining why it adheres to stare decisis, the
joint opinion considers what Roe has meant for the "generation of women
who have come of age" since it was decided, treats as a "fact" the notion
that people have organized relationships and choices around the availability
of abortion should contraception fail, and concludes that the cost for people
who have ordered their thinking and living around the protection promised
by Roe cannot be dismissed. 3'
The decision making protected by privacy, not merely the ultimate
decision, is necessary to the development and expression of personhood and
personality, including the freedom to exercise moral responsibility.32
Ronald Dworkin therefore interprets the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence in terms of moral responsibility and moral independence:
The Court's previous privacy decisions can be justified only on
the assumption that decisions affecting marriage and childbirth
are so important, so intimate and personal, so critical to the
development of personality and sense of moral responsibility, and
so closely tied to religious and ethical convictions protected by
the First Amendment, that people must be allowed to make these
decisions for themselves, consulting their own conscience, rather
than allowing society to thrust its collective decision on them.33
Moreover, with respect to abortion, Dworkin concludes:
The abortion decision is at least as much a private decision in
that sense as any other the Court has protected. In many ways

70-18) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973).

30 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809 (citing Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and
Women's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom 109, 133 n.7 (rev.

ed. 1990)); see also id. at 2807-08.

31 See id. at 2809.
32 Similarly, equality-based defenses of abortion have spoken of the responsibility
of self-determination as a component of equal citizenship and of how restricting the
right to abortion "denies women the capacity of responsible citizenship." See Sylvia
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1017 (1984).

33 Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 29, 1989,
at 49, 51.
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it is more private, because the decision involves a woman's
control not just of her connections to others, but of the use of her
own body, and the Constitution recognizes in a variety of ways
the special intimacy of a person's connection to her own physical
integrity.34
Privacy, thus interpreted, is bound up with notions of the intimacy of
one's connection to one's self, to one's body, and to others, as well as of
the protection of self-determination notwithstanding public disapproval."
With respect to the first notion, the strength of an appeal to bodily integrity
is clear from its prominence in Casey, where the joint opinion found it to
be one of the two doctrinal bases for women's constitutional liberty at
stake, invoking cases recognizing "limits on governmental power to
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection. "36 The second notion
Dworkin elaborates is freedom to exercise moral responsibility, to make
decisions for oneself despite state disapproval or alleged majoritarian
preferences to the contrary. On this point the Casey joint opinion expresses
only qualified adherence.37
2.

The Disappearance of Privacy?

The view of privacy as protecting reproductive decisions critical to
personhood finds articulation in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a contraception case
invoked in Roe and Casey: "[l]f the right to privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 3" Roe characterized Eisen-

' Id. at 51. The strong endorsement of privacy in the statements quoted in the text
may be in some tension with Dworkin's qualified support for the Casey joint opinion.
See Dworkin, supra note 5; infra text accompanying notes 64, 85, 103, 107.
" In his concurrence in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, Justice Stevens

contends that "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs
to himself and not others nor to society as a whole."' Id. at 777 & n.5 (citing Charles
Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 288-89 (1977)). On Fried's attempt, as
Solicitor General, to distinguish between Griswold and Roe in the Webster litigation,
see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 95, 101-02 (1990); see also

Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account
71-88 (1991).
36 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2810. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 51-53,
the other basis is the line of cases protecting liberty to make certain important decisions
concerning family, contraception, marriage, and the like. Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 57-71, 97-125.
18

405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 3:1

stadt as establishing that the right of privacy has "some extension" to
activities relating to procreation. 39 The Casey joint opinion quoted most
of the foregoing passage from Eisenstadt, but omitted the characterization
of the right as the right of privacy. 4
While privacy jurisprudence concerning abortion generally falls under
the rubric of "Roe v. Wade," Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe emphasized the role of the physician. 4 Recognizing that the right of privacy,
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, was
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy," the Court nonetheless placed the "basic
responsibility" for the abortion decision with the physician and characterized the decision as "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision."4 2
The privacy rationale for constitutional protection of a woman's
decision concerning abortion thus finds strongest expression in Thornburgh
43 (including Justice
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
Stevens' concurrence) and in the opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun
in Casey. In Thornburgh, the Court (in an opinion also written by Justice
Blackmun) more explicitly focused on the woman as the proper locus of
decision making, making the association of privacy with liberty and
autonomy clear:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies
a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government .... That
promise extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are
more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic
to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision. . . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make
that choice freely is fundamental.44
In Casey, the joint opinion similarly focuses squarely on the woman and
uses closely parallel imagery of the "promise" of a "realm of personal
liberty" held forth by the Constitution, a realm of "personal" and

the Court first elaborated the right to privacy in the context of married persons' use of
contraceptives.
9 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
4 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. The Court does, however, quote the entire
passage in the context of the husband notification provision. Id. at 2830. See infra text
accompanying note 126.
4' See Jane Maslow Cohen, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Deliberative Autonomy
and Abortion, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. 177 (1992).
42 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 164-65, 166.
43 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey.
4
Id. at 772.
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"intimate" (although not "private") decision making.45 As argued below,
given that Casey overrules Thornburgh as to the constitutionality of state
efforts to persuade women to choose childbirth instead of abortion, this
disappearance of privacy talk may not be without consequence.
The constitutional protection of a sphere of individual liberty
elaborated in Thornburgh and Casey reflects an allocation (or reservation)
of decision-making power to the individual rather than the state. While
"privacy," rather than liberty or autonomy, may well be a "misnomer" for
the right that grounds the legal protection of abortion,' "privacy"
nonetheless has stood not for isolation of the right holder for its own sake,
but for the critical importance of a space for decision making and the
constitutive nature of such decision making. Thus, while the specter of
literal state intrusion into the marital bedroom led the Court in Griswold v.
to find a statute prohibiting the use of contraception particularly
Connecticut47
"repulsive," the Court in subsequent cases has interpreted Griswold as
teaching that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state." Justice Stevens,
whose privacy jurisprudence strongly reflects the theme of privacy as
autonomy and liberty of conscience, 49 has suggested that while the Court
has emphasized privacy, "its decisions have actually been animated by an
even more fundamental concern . . , the abiding interest in individual
liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide
how he [or she] will live his [or her] own life intolerable." 50

' Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 ("[Ilt is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."). On the "intimate"
and "personal" nature of the decision, see id. at 2807, 2808, 2810.

' See Tribe, supra note 24, § 15-10:
[Wihat is truly implicated in the decision whether to abort or to give birth is
not privacy, but autonomy. And the issue of individual autonomy-of control

over one's body and reproductive destiny-is in turn a question of power, pure
and simple. Roe v. Wade was less a judgment about the relative importance of
maternal liberty and fetal life, than it was a decision about who should make
judgments of that sort.
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
48 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431

U.S. 678, 687 (1977). The Casey

joint opinion repeatedly relies on Carey's articulation of constitutional protection for

decision making. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-08, 2810-11.
4' For another defense of the right to privacy stressing the jurisprudence of Justice

Stevens, see Susan Estrich & Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an
Audience of One, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 125-28 (1989).
50 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
781 n. I1(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp.,
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This delimitation of the respective roles of the citizen and the state is
rooted in the eloquent defense of individuals against totalitarian state control
and orthodoxy in such early cases as Meyer v. Nebraska5 and Pierce v.

Society of Sisters. 2

The demarcation is again invoked in Griswold's

explication of the right of privacy, and in the Court's recent school prayer
decision, Lee v. Weisman. 3 In the context of procreative decisions, in his
concurring opinion in Thornburgh, Justice Stevens interpreted the fundamental premises underlying Roe as placing "the primary responsibility for
decisions in matters of childbearing in the private sector of our society."'
Public recognition of, and support for, that allocation of responsibility may
be seen in the successful use by pro-choice advocates of the slogan "Who
decides?" and in poll data indicating strong support for the proposition that
the government should not prohibit a woman from choosing to have an
abortion-even if others may think it is the wrong thing to do in particular
cases. 5 As Dworkin argues, noting, that such decisions implicate one's
deepest, and often one's religious, beliefs, "[tiolerance is a cost we must

pay for our adventure in liberty." 56

523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976)), overruled
in part by Casey. Under Stevens' analysis, "the essential 'liberty' that animated the
development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely embraces
the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider
offensive or immoral." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218.
51 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
52 268 U.S. 510 (1925). These ancestors of privacy jurisprudence are, however,
a double-edged sword as applied to pregnant female minors. On the one hand,
arguments supporting the constitutionality of parental notification and consent
requirements draw upon the recognition in those precedents of "the guiding role of
parents in the upbringing of their children." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410
(1981) (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
637 (1979) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). On the other hand, some members of the
Court have argued that such requirements are contrary to the protection of family
privacy from unwarranted state intrusion that those precedents establish, see Matheson,
450 U.S. at 447-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting), or have invoked the anti-totalitarian
principle of those precedents against parental notification requirements premised on an
ideal of the family which often does not correspond to reality. See Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2946 (1990) (Stevens, J.) (invoking Meyer, 262 U.S. at
399-400, to reject state interest in "making the 'private realm of family life' conform
to some state-designed idea")..
For a discussion of the "appealing" yet "problematic, potentially dangerous"
concept of decisional family privacy, see Allen, supra note 25, at 110-18.
3 * 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
14 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled in part by Casey.
" See E.J. Dionne, Poll Finds Ambivalence on Abortion Persists in U.S., N.Y.
Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at A18.
56 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be
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Might not one cheer Casey's focus on liberty, rather than privacy, as
merely recognizing that privacy is a "misnomer" and situating the abortion
decision more firmly within the constitutional framework? Moreover,
might not "liberty" pure and simple better capture what is really at
issue-self-determination? 7 How significant is the Court's omission of
any explicit reliance upon the right of privacy in explicating its view of "the
essential holding of Roe"? (Justice Blackmun, for example, reads the joint
opinion as reaffirming the right of privacy and instead focuses on the
disappearance of strict scrutiny.58)
Consider the different characterizations of the abortion decision and of
"informed consent" in Thornburgh and Casey. Thornburgh characterized
"the decision to terminate a pregnancy" as "an intensely private one," one
that "'may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the
contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties.""' 9 In Thornburgh, the Court struck down a number of Pennsylvania's abortion
regulations allegedly furthering "informed consent " ' ° as in reality serving
to intimidate women and to "wedge the Commonwealth's message

Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381, 427 (1992). The theme of moral independence and
toleration is also sounded by David Richards, in his Rawlsian interpretation of the
Constitution and justification of abortion. See David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the
Constitution 261-69 (1986). In an analysis cited by pro-choice litigants, Richards
interprets privacy in terms of autonomy, or liberty of conscience, and freedom of
intimate association in pursuing a conception of the good. See Brief for Amici Curiae
Women Who Have Had Abortions and Friends of Amici Curiaein Support of Appellees
at 6 n.4, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
In justifying women's right to decide to have an abortion, as an exercise of liberty of
conscience and moral independence, Richards cites Carol Gilligan's discussion of "the
moral conscientiousness of an abortion decision for women." Richards, supra, at 268
(citing Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 70-71 (1982)).
s See Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of
New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion
Action Coalition at 14-24, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-40), reprinted
in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law, Roe v. Wade 563, 592-602 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1973) (1990); Rosalind Petchesky, Introduction to Amicus Brief: -Richard
Thonburgh v. American College of Gynecologists, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 3 (1986)
(arguing for feminist interpretation of liberty as self-determination); Elizabeth
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 995-98 (1991) (drawing
upon Justice Douglas' concurrence in Roe in her assessment of affirmative potential of
privacy as encompassing liberty, equality, freedom of bodily integrity, autonomy, and
self-determination).
58 See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2846-52.
9 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 766 (1986) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 655 (1979)), overruled in part by Casey.
"oId. at 759-65.
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discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed consent dialogue
between the woman and her physician. "6
The Casey joint opinion claims to reaffirm the "essential holding of
Roe" while upholding nearly identical regulations as permissible state
efforts to "persuade" women not to choose abortion, so long as women are
the ultimate decision makers.62 In one of only two explicit references to
the right of privacy in the joint opinion, the Court rejects the argument that
the informed consent provision interferes with "a constitutional right of
privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician," since whatever
constitutional status such a relationship has is derived from the woman's
position and "does not underlie or override the two more general rights
under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family
decisions and the right to physical autonomy."63 Here we have travelled
from Roe's placement of the responsible physician at center stage to
Thornburgh's situation of the woman as decision maker in a private
dialogue with her physician to Casey's removal of the physician from the
stage, except as message bearer for the state.
In a crucial formulation intended to offer guidance, the Court restates
the right recognized in Roe:
Some guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the
woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be
insulatedfrom all others in doing so. Regulations which do no
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or
the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect
for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose...
•Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure
designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will
be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seekingan abortion are
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.
Id. at 762.
See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (noting "virtual identity" to Thornburgh regulations). The main difference
between the regulations in Thornburgh and Casey appears to be the inclusion in the
earlier scheme of required disclosure of "the fact that there may be detrimental physical
and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable." Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 760; see discussion infra part II.B.3. Although Justices Stevens and Blackmun
joined in parts I-III of Casey upholding Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, White, and Thomas joined part V-B and -D upholding the informed consent
procedures.
63 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
61

62

64 Id. at 2821 (emphasis added).

Dworkin apparently agrees with the Court's

reading of Roe: "Roe itself did not grant a right, fundamental or otherwise, that states
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Perhaps the seeds of this "non-right" to insulation were planted with Roe's
qualification that a pregnant woman "cannot be isolated in her privacy,"'
although here that phrase takes on new, and probably unintended, meaning.
One need only contrast the prominence of the language of privacy in the
characterization of women's decision making in the partially dissenting
opinions of Justices Blackmun' and Stevens67 to show the distance from
Roe to Thornburgh to Casey. The disappearance of privacy and of strict
scrutiny, and the latitude given to state second-guessing, imperil women's
reproductive liberty. As Justice Stevens argues in Casey, this new approach
denies women equal respect and equal dignity.68
The simplest explanation for the divergent results in Thornburgh and
Casey (aside from changed Court membership) is the dramatically greater
weight given in Casey to the state's interest in potential life throughout
pregnancy and the substitution of the undue burden test for strict scrutiny
in the assessment of state regulations prior to viability. Indeed, the Casey
joint opinion announces that it rejects Roe's trimester framework as not
"part of the essential holding of Roe" and as "in practice . . . undervalu[ing] the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe."69 This
"revised Roe" is the joint opinion's attempt to reconcile women's liberty
and the state's interest in protecting potential life, an interest it claims has
received "too little" attention in decisions subsequent to Roe.70 Is such a
"privacy, modified"'" an inevitable consequence of applying a privacy
analysis to pregnant women's constitutional liberty or is it a result of failure
to take privacy seriously?

not encourage responsibility in the decision a woman makes or that states not display
a collective view of which decision is most appropriate." Dworkin, supra note 56, at
410.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).

6 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2847 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
67 See id. at 2840, 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68 See id. at 2842.
69 Id. at 2818.
70 See id. at 2817.
7' The allusion, admittedly a stretch, is to Catharine MacKinnon's Feminism
Unmodified, see MacKinnon, supra note 13, and to the debate over whether the
representation of women in such theories as hers excludes "women modified" by race,
class, and other differences. See generally Harris, supra note 18. Here the point is the
impact upon the right of privacy of pregnancy and the state's interest in potential life.
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B. Privacy and the "Unique" Condition of Pregnancy:
The Trajectory from Roe to Casey
From the outset, although the Court situated a woman's liberty with
respect to choosing to continue or terminate her pregnancy within the
cluster of such constitutionally protected important decisions as those
concerning family, marriage, education, and contraception, it characterized
abortion as "inherently different" from such situations because of the nature
of pregnancy.72 Thus, while the Court in Thornburgh stated that the right
to a private sphere of individual liberty "extends to women as well as to
men,"7 3 the Court in Roe had previously characterized that right with
respect to the abortion decision as limited and "not unqualified." 74 As the
Court put it, "the pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She
carries an embryo and, later, a fetus . . . . "' But while the State of
Texas argued for a constitutionally grounded "right to life" for the fetus,
the Court held that the term "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment "does not include the unborn." 76 The Casey joint opinion
implicitly reaffirms that holding; moreover, as Justice Stevens notes, "no
member of the Court has ever questioned this fundamental proposition."'
The persistent formulation of the abortion issue as pitting fetuses' rights
against women's liberty ignores the constitutional underpinning of Roe and
fails to acknowledge the location of the interest in the state rather than in
the fetus.
Without specifying the source of this interest, the issue both Roe and
Casey address is "how best to accommodate the State's interest in potential
life with the constitutional liberties of pregnant women." 78 Justice Stevens
suggests that the state interest is one not grounded in the Constitution but
supported by "humanitarian and pragmatic concerns. " " Roe recognized
and protected the state's compelling interest in protecting fetal life after
viability, the time when the fetus "presumably has the capability of
72 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).

3 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.

747, 772 (1986), overruled in part by Casey.

14 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. In Roe, the Court also appeared to reject, outside of the
context of pregnancy, any general claim of an unlimited right to do as one pleases with
one's body. See id.
15 Id. at 159.
76 Id. at 156-58.
" Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2839 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part);
see also Dworkin, supra note 56, at 398-402.
78 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
9 Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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meaningful life outside the mother's womb," by allowing a state to "go so
far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother."'
Arguably, the viability
line, which is grounded in the "biological facts and truths of fetal development,""' accommodates adequately not only the state's asserted interest in
protecting potential life, but also the need to maintain a taboo against taking
life or to foster regard for human life in general, since late-term abortion
may be particularly offensive to some people. 2
The real battles over Roe have not, however, been primarily about
post-viability abortion (which, like late abortions, are few in number
although central to anti-choice rhetoric 3 ) but over state regulations to
protect fetal life prior to viability, including outright prohibition of
abortion. On the one hand, with respect to outright prohibition, Casey
adheres to the viability line as to women's ultimate choice, stating: "The
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most
central principle of Roe v. Wade."' On the other hand, as noted above,
Casey rejects Roe's trimester framework with respect to state regulation of
women's decision making and upholds measures designed to protect
potential life and persuade women against abortion at every stage of
pregnancy, provided the measures are not unduly burdensome. In such a
move, the joint opinion finds a perhaps surprising ally in Dworkin, who
argues that the state interest identified in Roe-admittedly "mysterious" in
Roe and subsequent cases-is "a legitimate interest in maintaining a moral
environment in which decisions about life and death, including the abortion
decision, are taken seriously, [and] treated as matters of moral gravity."'
o Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
82 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part), 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Webster, 492 U.S.
at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Casey); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Women's
Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom 351-52 (rev. ed. 1990)
(interpreting data showing that between 92% and 96% of abortions took place in first
trimester as reflecting sense of importance of fetal development and "implicit moral
code" at work in women's decisions); Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 105, 131 (1989) (arguing that "[miany people, including strongly prochoice people, view a fetus as sharing our humanity in an important way, especially late

in pregnancy," as indicated by widespread acceptance of limiting late abortions).
83 See Celeste Michelle Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric:

Communicating

Social Change 79-89 (1990) (on strategic use of imagery of late-term fetuses in "prolife" literature); see also Petchesky, supra note 82, at 351-52.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
85 Dworkin, supra note 56, at 428; see also supra note 64. An assessment of the
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Casey's revision of Roe must be understood within the context of the
erosion of privacy jurisprudence well prior to Casey.
1. The Poverty of Privacy for Poor Women?
From Roe to Rust
In a series of decisions subsequent to Roe, the Court permitted a wide
range of state restrictions on access to abortion prior to viability. It argued
that these restrictions did not impinge women's right of privacy on the
ground that Roe did not prevent a state from making "a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and ... implement[ing] that judgment by
the allocation of public funds. "I For example, the Court held that a state
need not show a compelling interest to provide Medicaid funds for
childbirth but not abortion (even those that are medically necessary), or to
provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth but not "nontherapeutic" abortion, because such regulations do not place an obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion but merely encourage childbirth, an
"alternative activity deemed in the public interest."'
Indeed, it is from
such cases that the notion of undue burden, which triumphed in Casey,
originated.
Webster and Rust v. Sullivan88 carried that line further: Webster
upheld a prohibition on the use of public facilities or medical personnel for
abortion, even where a woman seeks to use her own private physician, and
Rust upheld a ban on even mentioning abortion as an option in family
planning clinics receiving any federal funding. The public funding
decisions triggered bitter dissents from members of the Court who pointed
out the encroachment of such holdings upon women's (particularly poor
women's) privacy rights in the name of "state-mandated morality." 89 But
implications of Dworkin's seeming move from "taking rights seriously" to "exercising
rights responsibly" awaits elaboration. See McClain, supra note 20.
86 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
87 See id. (holding states not constitutionally required to pay Medicaid benefits for

"nontherapeutic" (i.e., not medically necessary) abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 315 (1980) (holding states not required to pay for medically necessary abortions
for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under Hyde Amendment to Title XIX
and upholding Hyde Amendment funding restrictions on medically necessary abortions);

Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (holding no constitutional violation if state
provides publicly financed hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic

abortions).
88 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
89 See, e.g., McRae, 448 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (such restrictions
foist majoritarian viewpoint disapproving of abortion upon only "that segment of our
society which, because of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend
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critics of Roe's privacy analysis have pointed to such decisions as showing
the poverty of privacy and the effect of relegating reproductive rights to the
private sphere.' ° Here the literal poverty of privacy is at issue, since it is
poor women, among them many women of color, who lack the practical
means to effectuate decisions to terminate a pregnancy and may not exercise
their rights, or may only do so accompanied by financial and other
hardships, including increased health risks.9 By the Court's reasoning,
it is women's indigency, not the state's preferential funding, that restricts
women's "ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected
freedom of choice. "' Thus, Dorothy Roberts argues that while privacy
as "personhood" protects independent decision making, "abstract freedom
to choose is of meager value without meaningful options from which to
choose and the ability to effectuate one's choice." 9 3
The line of cases from Maher to Rust raises complex constitutional
issues about state preferences, selective funding, interpretations of the Due
Process clause, and the application of constitutional norms of equality which
are outside the scope of this Article.' However, a few points are critical

its privacy rights from the encroachments of state-mandated morality"). There can be
no doubt that religious opposition to abortion played a key role in achieving such
restrictions on funding, as the history of the Hyde Amendments makes clear. See
Tribe, supra note 35, at 151-59.
' See MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 93, 100-01; Petchesky, supra note 82, at
xxi-xxvi, 295-302.
9' See Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right.of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1477 (1991)
(advancing privacy argument but arguing that from perspective of women of color,
connection between privacy and abortion funding decisions is most compelling argument
against privacy rhetoric). On the impact of funding decisions on low income women,
see Petchesky, supra note 82, at 155-61; Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms
and African American Women, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 255, 279-83 (1992).
92

McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.

'3 Roberts, supra note 91, at 1478.
9 The abortion funding problem poses a number of distinct and difficult issues of
constitutional interpretation that a privacy argument must face. First, can a privacy
argument effectively counter the interpretation of the Constitution underlying Rust and
before it Webster, that "'the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual"'?
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (quoting Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491 (1989), quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). The interpretation of the
Constitution as a charter of negative-rather than positive-liberties is hardly new,
although the Court's invocation of it in the controversial decision in DeShaney, upon
which the Webster plurality and the Rust majority relied, has received considerable
critical attention. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 19, at 91-98. Second, if the government, while not obligated to do so, chooses to subsidize one activity and not another,
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here. First, while some critics of those decisions view them as following
logically from Roe's reliance upon privacy, other critics do not. Indeed,
some urge affirmative obligations of government arising from commitment
to privacy as personhood.9 5 Those decisions are not a failure of privacy
jurisprudence, but rather a failure to take privacy seriously.' At the same
time, additional arguments rooted in constitutional bases other than privacy
have been used and may be necessary to challenge such results. Finally,
prior to Casey, the Court drew a distinction (persuasive or not) between a
state permissibly attempting to persuade women against abortion through

does a right of privacy provide a persuasive argument against such selective funding,
either on its own or through the fundamental rights branch of Equal Protection analysis?

See, e.g., Rachael N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive
Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407, 419
(1992) (arguing that line of cases from McRae to Rust violates requirement that, under
constitutional equality norms, "government must act with neutrality in the distribution
of benefits or burdens that affect the exercise of important liberties such as free speech
and reproductive choice").
01 See Richards, supra note 56, at 262 (discussing McRae and arguing that the
prohibition of abortion services infringes exercise of essential moral powers of private
life). For arguments for affirmative government obligations, see, e.g., Roberts, supra
note 91, at 1479 (in context of argument against punishing crack-addicted pregnant
women, arguing for affirmative duty of government to "protect the individual's personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination");
Tribe, supra note 24, § 15-2 (arguing that privacy need not be read as purely negative
right, but that both negative and positive obligations of government can flow out of
"substantive vision of the needs of human personality"); cf. Glendon, supra note 19,
at 61-66 (noting that certain Western European countries recognize affirmative
obligations of government stemming from constitutionally recognized rights of
personality and development of personality); Pine & Law, supra note 94, at 421-23
(arguing that securing affirmative reproductive liberties requires going beyond
traditional constitutional guarantees); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 641,707 (1990) (arguing that Due Process Clause
can be source of affirmative obligations of government "to take action to facilitate,
protect, and ensure those choices most essential to [human flourishing and] freedom").
It is important to note that the strongest defenders of privacy on the Court, Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, all dissented in McRae and, with the
exception of Justice Stevens' partial concurrence, in Webster.
96 In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court (per Justice White)
upheld, on communitarian grounds, Georgia's sodomy statute as applied to homosexual
sodomy. This decision has been widely cited as showing the limits of privacy jurisprudence, but the better argument is that it was wrongly decided. See id. at 199-214
(Blackmun, J., dissenting; joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.), 214-20
(Stevens, J., dissenting; joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.); Anand Agneshwar,
Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong: Powell on Sodomy, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5,
1990, at 3 (reporting Justice Powell's public remarks that he may have made mistake
by voting with majority in Bowers).
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down its state's anti-sodomy law,
ruling that the statute violated privacy rights under the state constitution. See Kentucky
Justices Strike Down Anti-Sodomy Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1992, at A13.
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preferential funding and services, and the state impermissibly wedging its
preference for childbirth, through informed consent requirements, into
women's decision-making process itself.
2. Protecting Women's Liberty and Accommodating the
State's Interest in Protecting Potential Life: Casey
The Court in Casey speaks of the woman's liberty at stake in the
abortion decision as "unique to the human condition and so unique to the
law."' More explicitly than Roe, and evocative of Thornburgh, Casey
links reproductive choice to a woman's existential decisions, her spirituality, and her personhood:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.98
Yet the joint opinion goes on to say that its analysis begins but cannot end
there because abortion "is more than a philosophic exercise," it is also
conduct, "an act fraught with consequences for others."' Here, tension
between women's liberty and the state's interest in potential life emerges.
At the outset the Court explains that the state cannot proscribe abortion
in all instances because of the "unique" liberty of the woman. Its
characterization of pregnancy and of interpretations of women's reproductive role is striking and poignant (if idealizing), even while the frequent
modifiers the Court uses may signal trouble ahead:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.
That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race
been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the
eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone
be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her

97

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.

98 Id.

" Id. Just who are those others? The Court explains that they are "the persons
who perform and assist in the procedure; . . . the spouse, family, and society which
must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist ... ; and, depending on one's
beliefs ....
the life or potential life that is aborted." Id.
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suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and
our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives
and her place in society.'
Here the medical picture of the abortion decision in Roe with the physician
front and center gives way to a focus on the pregnant woman, her life, her
pains, her suffering, and her right to form her own interpretation of what
procreation means in her life. The above passage also brings to mind the
imagery of "distress" used in Roe to describe the consequences of restricting
abortion: "maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future.'' 10 1
Yet while the Roe Court focused on the consequences for the pregnant
woman, her family, and the future child of the forced continuation of an
unwanted pregnancy, the Caseyjoint opinion focuses on the consequences
of a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy-consequences for "the
woman who must live with the impact of the consequences of her decision"
and for "others," among them society (including those who deem abortion
"nothing short of an act of violence against innocent life") and, "depending
on one's beliefs, . . . the life or potential life that is aborted.' 1 2 As
argued below, this dramatic characterization of "consequences" appears to
drive the joint opinion's analysis of why state procedures designed to protect
potential life and dissuade women from choosing abortion are constitutionally permissible, even if they lead to increased costs and delay.
Although the Court's treatment of "consequences" brings to mind Dworkin's
evocation of the state's interest in the "moral environment" and how
decisions concerning the "sanctity of life" are made, the Court (like the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) nowhere explains exactly what the basis
for the state's interest in potential life is or why its preference for childbirth
over abortion-irrespective of the circumstances and beliefs of particular
women-should receive such judicial solicitude. The treatment suggests
protection of the pure value of "life" as such without any concern for the
quality of life of the woman, her family, or her future child.'0 3

'00 Id. (emphasis added); cf. Genesis 3:16 ("To the woman, he said, 'I will greatly
multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children, yet your desire
shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you."').
101 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
102 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
103 See Dworkin, supra note 56, at 405-09.
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3. Informed Consent and "Wise Exercise" of Women's
Reproductive Liberty
What does the Casey joint opinion's qualified defense of women's
liberty mean for the privacy justification of women's reproductive autonomy? As argued above, on the Court's reading of Roe, women have no right
to be insulated from state persuasion against abortion or the state's
expression of its "profound respect for the life of the unborn"; on that
reading, such persuasion in and of itself is not "undue" interference so long
as it is not a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortion. 0 4 Thus,
Casey affirms the informed consent requirement before it as facilitating the
"wise exercise" of a woman's right to decide to terminate a pregnancy "free
of undue interference by the State."'0 5 But can one doubt what "wise
exercise" of women's right to choose means? The statute and the joint
opinion, in upholding the requirement, conflate furthering women's
informed choice with state persuasion against abortion. Such conflation
substantially retreats from the decisional privacy this Article defends, as the
dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens make clear. Moreover, aside
from the intrusion into women's decisional privacy, one cannot ignore the
practical effect of the informed consent provisions on women's ability to
exercise their rights-an impact the Court found "troubling" as to some
women but not, on the record before it, an undue burden.106
Illustrative of the conflation of informed choice and persuasion, the
joint opinion defines a state's interest in regulating abortion as permitting
the state to set up what the Court calls a "reasonable framework for a
woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning," by
which a woman is encouraged "to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing
the pregnancy."'0 7 Since the Court explicitly links the informed choice
provisions to permissible state efforts to persuade women against abortion,
it is hardly necessary to substantiate the claim that the state's goal is to
persuade women against abortion and not to enhance truly autonomous,

04 But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2847 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("under Roe, any more than de minimis interference is undue").
'0sId. at 2826.
106 See id. at 2825.
107 Id. at 2818. Dworkin praises the Court for such a characterization of the state
interest. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 30. Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens indicates, it is
not at all clear how the procedures described below inform the woman of philosophic
arguments. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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deliberative choice. 0 8 In contrast, both Justices Stevens and Blackmun
distinguish permissible procedures designed to enhance and inform choice
from state persuasion. Enhancing deliberative autonomy would appear to
be the joint opinion's goal only to the extent that those justices accept that
women are choosing abortion out of ignorance or without due attention to
arguments against abortion. Thus, promoting "maternal health," an additional basis proffered for the informed consent provisions, appears to be
limited to protecting women from the psychological consequences of
choosing abortion.0 9
The informed consent provision upheld by the Casey joint opinion
requires a twenty-four-hour waiting period after a woman requests an
abortion and is offered, among other things, printed materials "which
describe the unborn child and list agencies which offer alternatives to
abortion."" 0 The joint opinion concludes that the state, by such a provision, attempts to "ensure that a woman apprehends the full consequences of
her decision" and so to reduce the "risk" that a woman may elect an
abortion, "only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.""' A foreshadowing
of this fear of a precipitous abortion decision is clearly seen in Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
(prominent in the Casey briefs), in which she concluded that a twenty-four108 See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818, 2821, 2823-25. The Court explicitly
grounds one justification for the informed consent provisions in the state's interest in
protecting potential life, even absent a relationship to maternal health, id. at 2823, 2825,
and makes no effort to link the 24-hour waiting period to maternal health rather than to
the state's interest in protecting the life of the unborn. Id. at 2825. Significantly, the
Act which the Court upholds is entitled the "Abortion Control Act."
09 The Court's lack of concern for maternal health, apart from the Court's notion
of psychological devastation from abortion, also comes through in restrictions in funding
medically necessary abortion. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
In assessing whether the Caseyjoint opinion is really concerned with "informing
women's decisions about their reproductive health," Dorothy Roberts suggests that we
contrast Casey, which upholds regulations requiring doctors to provide women with

information designed to persuade them against abortion even if the women do not want
it, with Rust, which allows the government to deliberately withhold information about
abortion from millions of poor women, even when the woman specifically requests it.
Both holdings, she argues, deny women's self-determination and ability to make their
own decisions about pregnancy. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 18, 38.
"o Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2834. The materials are to describe "probable anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments," to include pictures at two-week increments, and to provide relevant information
on the possibility of "the unborn child's survival," while making sure such materials
are appropriate to the woman's stage of pregnancy. The materials are also to contain
"objective information describing the methods of abortion procedures commonly
employed." Id. at 2828-36.
. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
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hour waiting period, if it imposes costs, is "surely a small cost to impose to
ensure that the woman's decision is well considered in light of its certain
irreparable consequences on fetal life, and the possible effects on her
own."

1

12

In particular, the piece of information the Court fears the woman may
lack is "the impact on the fetus," something the Court claims that "most
women considering an abortion would deem ...relevant, if not dispositive
to the decision.""' 3 This remarkable, if enigmatic, sentence stands without
any cited support. Moreover, the Court makes no mention of evidence
before it suggesting that for the great majority of women, the primary
reaction to abortion is relief,'14 that (granting the difficult nature of the
decision and notwithstanding anecdotal examples) there is no significant
evidence of adverse psychological consequences resulting from abortion,115
and that a decision to continue a pregnancy may have potential negative
impacts upon the life of a woman, including adverse psychological
consequences upon the woman and, eventually, upon the future child. 6
Indeed, echoing Roe, one might as aptly say that "for most women consider112 Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 474 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting), overruled in part by Casey.
". Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. Admittedly, the quoted statement is ambiguous: it
could be interpreted to say "even if not dispositive" or "indeed, dispositive."
114 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of
Petitioners at 21, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744,
91-902) [hereinafter APA Brief] (citing studies such as Adler, David, Major, Roth,
Russo & Wyatt, Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 Science 41 (1990), and
other sources).
115 See id. at 21-23 (citing sources which include testimony of f6rmer Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop before Congress concerning federal study's conclusion that the
development of significant psychological problems related to abortion is "minuscule
from a public health perspective"); Kathleen McDonnell, Not an Easy Choice: A
Feminist Re-Examines Abortion 35 (1984) ("[W]hile many women may deeply regret
having become unwillingly pregnant and having had to make the abortion decision,
relatively few would reverse their decision or say they regret having had an abortion.").
In contrast, in its amicus brief, Feminists for Life of America stated as its interest
"having seen the adverse physical and psychological effects of abortion on women."
See Brief of Feminists for Life of America, Professional Women's Network, Birthright,
Inc., Legal Action for Women, as Amici Curiaein Support of Respondents and CrossPetitioners at Ia, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744,
91-902) (citing David C. Reardon, Aborted Women: Silent No More (1987) (relating
stories of women who had abortions and later regretted their decisions)).
116 In contrast, in Roe, the Court spoke of the "distressful life and future" resulting
from forced maternity and the consequences upon the child. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973). On the negative impact on the psychological health of women, see
APA Brief, supra note 114, at 20. A recent study suggests that women who are denied
abortions only rarely give up their unwanted babies for adoption, and many harbor
resentment and anger toward their children for years. See Natalie Angier, Study Says
Anger Troubles Women Denied Abortions, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at CIO.
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ing abortion," the impact of continuing pregnancy (on the woman, her
family, and, perhaps, the future child) is highly relevant, if not dispositive.
The Court's analysis of informed consent and women's health is
patronizing, selective, and in part contrary to fact. As the dissenters point
out, there was no evidence that the delay provision was of benefit to women
or furthered their informed consent, but rather considerable evidence (as the
District Court found) that the provisions would impose severe burdens on
many women." 17 Assuming that the provision was not designed merely
to wear women down and thus reduce the number of abortions (an
assumption some would reasonably challenge)," 8 Justice Stevens concludes it "appears to rest on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about
the decision making capacity of women or an illegitimate belief that an
abortion decision is presumptively wrong.""' 9 Indeed, it would appear that
the Court assumes that women who seek abortions do not understand what
abortion means with respect to a pregnancy. 120
Further, the analysis suggests not only a belief in the overriding value
of prenatal life but in some maternal (or merely humane) instinct that might
well prevent any woman who came to understand what abortion really is
and does to the "unborn child" from going through with it--certainly a
belief or hope of some proponents of the Pennsylvania provisions.' 2 ' In

See Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2842-43. Upholding informed consent as "in theory"
permissible, the joint opinion found the question whether in practice the 24-hour waiting
period would pose a "substantial obstacle" upon many women, particularly poor and
117

rural women, a "closer question." The Court was not persuaded, however, that it was

an undue burden. See id. at 2825.
"' Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act and similar acts have been regarded,
certainly by pro-choice advocates but by other observers as well, as attempts by
opponents of legal abortion to erode abortion rights incrementally, an alternative and
complementary strategy to recriminalizing abortion through more restrictive statutes.
See Cynthia Gorney, Endgame, Wash. Post Mag., Feb. 23, 1992, at 6 (quoting Denise
Neary, Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation Director); Adam Pertman, Abortion Debate
Heats Up: Foes, Backers Craft Strategy Across N.E., Boston Globe, Feb. 3, 1991, at
29 (New England states).
"1 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2841-42.
120 Compare the nineteenth-century medical profession's view that women getting
abortions did so because of "widespread popular ignorance of the true character of the
crime" and because of "a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the foetus is not

alive till after the period of quickening." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141-42 (1973).

See also Siegel, supra note 27, at 280-300.
121 Denise Neary, Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation Director, who worked on the
statute, has commented with respect to teenage women:
It's not just a little bit of mush, like the woman is led to believe ....

If these

girls knew the contents of their uterus had little tiny hands and legs, they would
not be as quick to say, "Yeah, go ahead and suck me out." When they do find
out, because they pick up Life magazine, or they're in a health class and
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requiring a physician to tell a woman who requests an abortion of the availability of materials "describing the unborn child and agencies providing
alternatives," is not the state conveying the message that once any woman
really understood the physical characteristics of "the unborn child" (not the
more medically correct term "embryo" or "fetus"), she would surely be
moved to choose against abortion, and, indeed "agencies" also holding that
view stand ready to help?
Consistent with Thornburgh and the view of privacy this Article
defends, Justice Stevens, dissenting, concludes: "Decisional autonomy must
limit the State's power to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations
its own views of what is best."' 22 Acknowledging that a woman considering abortion faces "a difficult choice having serious and personal consequences,"' 2 3 he nonetheless concludes that "[t]he authority to make such
traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human
dignity . . . . [and] a matter of conscience."' 124 He argues that women
seeking abortion are entitled to dignity and respect equal to that of women
choosing otherwise:. "No person undertakes such a decision lightly-and
States may not presume that a woman has failed to reflect adequately merely
because her conclusion differs from the State's preference."' 2 5

somebody does something on fetal development, they're destroyed, because
they're looking at a 9- or 10- or I 1-week fetus.
Gorney, supra note 118, at 6, 10. AAPLOG's amicus brief reports two instances of
women who were contemplating having abortions who decided against doing so after
an ultrasound procedure, since "seeing what was inside of them changed their mind."
Brief of the American Association of Prolife Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(AAPLOG) and the Amercian Association of Prolife Pediatricians (AAPLP) as Amici
Curiaein Support of Respondents at 11, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) [hereinafter AAPLOG Brief].
122 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840. Justice Stevens grants that the state
has an interest
in an informed and thoughtful "choice," may provide a reasonable framework for the
decision, and may prefer childbirth to abortion. See id.; see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123
Although the joint opinion makes no mention of it, the clinics challenging the
Act routinely offered women "options counseling," information about prenatal
development, and, if a woman showed uncertainty, encouraged her to delay the abortion.
See. Brief for Respondents at 17, 68, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
124 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840; see also McDonnell, supra note 115, at 36-38
(describing experience of making abortion decision as painful yet "empowering" and
potentially "a profoundly maturing experience"). Consider the formulation by politicians
and activists who support codifying Roe: "I am not pro-abortion. I am pro-choice." See
In Their Own Words: Transcript of Speech by Clinton Accepting Democratic Nomination, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1992, at A14; Kate Michelman, President of NARAL
(National Abortion Rights Action League), The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Transcript
#4366 (PBS, June 29, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
25 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2842. In his concurrence in Thornburgh, Justice Stevens
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4. Casey's Reaffirmation of Privacy Between Wife and
Husband
Casey strongly endorses women's decisional privacy within the marital
relationship by striking down the husband notification provision. Here, in
fact, is the only use the joint opinion explicitly and approvingly makes of
the right of privacy. In rejecting the common law notion of marriage as
inconsistent with present views of marriage and the nature of the Constitution, the Court quotes the operative language from Eisenstadt: "If the right
of privacy means anything .... ""' Therefore, although a woman's right
of privacy does not protect her from the state's efforts to persuade her to
continue her pregnancy, it does safeguard her from compelled disclosure of
personal decisions to her husband. Indeed, the very women the Court
repeatedly refers to as "victims,"' 2 7 the women who may have "very good
reasons" not to tell their husbands of their intention to have an abortion, still
must go through the informed consent and waiting period requirements by
which the state, in furthering its interest in potential life, may seek to
persuade them to choose childbirth.
Nonetheless, in its invalidation of the husband notification provision,
Casey provides reason to cheer pro-choice litigants' successful presentation
of the circumstances of women's lives and the practical impact of abortion
restrictions upon them. Making recourse to the record before it and
reiterating many of the findings of the lower court, the Court observes that
"there are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands"-women
who, if pregnant, "may have very good reasons" for not informing their

stated that "no individual should be compelled to surrender the freedom to make [the
abortion] decision for herself simply because her 'value preferences' are not shared by
the majority." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 776-77 (1986), overruled in part by Casey. Such moral independence is
protected notwithstanding the risk of "incorrect" decisions:
In the final analysis, the holding in Roe v. Wade presumes that it is far better
to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to deny all
individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their
destiny .... [T]he lawmakers who placed a special premium on the protection
of individual liberty have recognized that certain values are more important than
the will of a transient majority.
Id. at 781-82 (citing West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
126 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830.

How significant is the Court's repeated characterization of women subject to
domestic violence as "victims"? Is it their vulnerability to victimization at the hands of
27

their husbands that brings into the picture their right of privacy, or does the Court affirm
more generally a right of privacy?
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husbands of a decision to have an abortion. 2 ' The Court lifts the veil of
family privacy that some feminists have argued shields violence against
women in the home'2 9 and further distinguishes family privacy from a
married pregnant woman's individual right of privacy rooted in her bodily
integrity. 3
Just as Casey rejects proffered state rationales for husband notification
that are consistent with common law notions of marriage when marriage
meant the suspension of a woman's civil existence, but that are offensive to
present understandings, the Court similarly rejects any analogy with respect
to consent drawn between a parent-pregnant child relationship and a
husband-pregnant wife relationship. 3' Pondering just how much authority
recognizing a husband's interest in a fetus might give him over a wide range
of his wife's reproductive choices and behavior, the joint opinion (perhaps
here reflecting in particular Justice O'Connor's voice) concludes that "[a]
husband has no enforceable right to require his wife to advise him before
she exercises her personal choices."' 32 Thus, although Casey did not fully
reaffirm privacy between women and the state, it reaffirmed privacy
between wife and husband.
5. The Poverty of Privacy or the Promise of Liberty?
What, after Casey, is the poverty of privacy? I have argued that the
virtual disappearance of privacy from the Casey opinion (and with it, of
strict scrutiny) is significant because of the Court's nod to a state's ability
to design informed choice provisions intended to persuade women to choose
childbirth, so long as they pass the "undue burden" test. Therefore, the
Court could hardly have echoed Thornburgh's language about the intensely
private nature of the decision or affirmed any right to be free of public
scrutiny. Such erosion of women's privacy rights warrants concern.
At the same time, when one contrasts the joint opinion's eloquent, at
128

Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2826-28.

See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 57, at 974.
See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
131 See id. at 2830-31. The fact that I report this distinction
does not mean that I
endorse teen consent rules.
132 Id. at 2831.
At oral argument, Justice O'Connor conducted a line of inquiry
along the lines indicated in text. See Linda Greenhouse, Abortion and the Law: Court
Gets Stark Arguments on Abortion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1992, at Al; see also Sandra
Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1546, 1549-57 (1991) (chronicling
129

3o

Court's early acceptance and subsequent questioning of separate spheres ideology). I
use "voice" advisedly, since Justice O'Connor has cautioned both against reading her
jurisprudence as reflecting a "different voice" and against unwittingly reviving the cult
of domesticity. See id. at 1558.
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times poignant, articulation of the constitutional roots of women's liberty
with the limited scope of that liberty as characterized by those urging the
Court to overrule Roe-and by dissenters Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia--one may agree with Justice Blackmun in calling1 the
joint
33
principle.'
constitutional
and
courage
personal
of
act
"an
opinion
By repeatedly stating that it adheres to Roe's "essential holding"--a
woman's right to make the ultimate choice concerning her pregnancy prior
to viability-the joint opinion makes clear, one may reasonably conclude,
that legislative attempts to recriminalize abortion subject to certain narrow
exceptions (laws that might have passed muster under a rational basis test)
are unconstitutional: indeed, Casey's impact may already be seen in the
recent invalidation of Louisiana's abortion law by the Fifth Circuit and in
the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of
Guam's similarly restrictive law.'34 At the same time, the Casey joint
opinion may have the beneficial political impact of moving opponents of
legal abortion to more moderate ground, although it may be difficult to
discern politically expedient posturing from genuine shifts in strategy. For
instance, in seeming contradiction to its commitment to constitutional
protection for prenatal life from conception and the recriminalization of
abortion (with narrow exceptions), the Bush Administration indicated
qualified approval of the Casey decision and "reasonable restrictions on
abortion."' 35
With respect to court challenges to laws like the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act, much hinges on the further application of the undue burden
test, but the first indicators suggest that the Supreme Court may take its time
before considering further challenges to restrictions similar to Pennsylvania's. 36 As for protecting privacy in the political arena, much will

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See Court Backs Overturning of Strict Abortion Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,
1992, at A25 (reporting Fifth Circuit decision in Barnes v, Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 1992 WL 289333 (U.S. 1992) (No. 92-588) (holding Louisiana law
banning all abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or threat to woman's life "clearly
unconstitutional" in light of Casey)); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Spurns Guam Bid
to Revive Curbs on Abortion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1992, at A l (reporting Court's denial
of certiorari in Ada v. Guam, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633
(1992)). But see infra note 136 and accompanying text.
131 See Maralee Schwartz & Dan Balz, Issue Passes to Politicians: Decision
Is Grist
for Election-Year Mill, Wash. Post, June 30, 1992, at Al (Bush indicating he was
"pleased" by decision); see also Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Tries to Recoup from Harsh
Tone on "Values," N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al.
136 Justice Blackmun and others read the joint opinion as leaving the door open to
successful "as applied" challenges (however costly and protracted such litigation may
be). See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2845, 2852 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). But see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Abortion Case,
'3'
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depend on the success of pro-choice advocates in undertaking public
education about the impact of such provisions upon the lives and health 3of7
women, particularly in states with few or only one abortion provider,1
and in persuading voters and legislatures-through legislation like the
Freedom of Choice Act-to protect decisional privacy."
For the Casey Court, the distinction between the state precluding
pregnant women from making the ultimate choice and merely persuading
them against abortion is critical. Dworkin seemingly approves such a
distinction, arguing that a state may seek to encourage responsibility in
decisions about the sanctity of life, and even indicate its own view of the
right decision, yet may not enforce conformity with the state's own view of
what sanctity means. 3 1 Whether the joint opinion's interpretation of Roe
is a substantial revision of that precedent or is technically correct will no
doubt provoke much debate. However, it is an interpretation considerably
at odds with the elaboration of Roe in privacy jurisprudence between Roe
and Casey which this Article defends-as the Court, by partially overruling
such cases as Akron and Thornburgh, acknowledged.
To the extent Casey is a continuation of the trajectory begun in Harris
and Maher, it brings into sharp focus the need to challenge the state's
asserted interest in childbirth independent of the choices and circumstances
of particular women, rather than in the reproductive health of citizens 4

N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1992, at A22 (discussing Court's refusal to hear Barnes v. Moore,
970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1992 WL 289333 (U.S. 1992) (No. 92-588)
(challenging Mississippi's law)).
117 Public opinion apparently supports the type of regulations
upheld in Casey and
on the books or under consideration in a number of other states. See, e.g., U.S.A.
Today, June 30, 1992, at A1; American Political Network Abortion Report, Pennsylvania: 77% Pro-Choice, but Majority Favor Law, July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File; Richard Davis, The Supreme Court Heeds the Voice of the People,
Christian Sci. Monitor, July 17, 1992, at 19 (citing May 1992 Times Mirror survey).
Thirteen states have waiting periods of at least 24 hours; 26 states have mandatory

counseling regarding alternatives and fetal development. See Abortion Angst, supra note
4 (citing NARAL, Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion Rights (3d ed.
1992)). NARAL's publication also indicates proposed legislation in many other states.
"' Michelman, supra note 124.
139 Dworkin, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818); Dworkin,
supra
note 56, at 409-10. Like the Casey Court, Dworkin leaves open whether a waiting
period could so raise costs and difficulty in securing abortion as to become an undue
burden. Id. at 410.
140 Amici curiae in Casey attempted to situate the informed consent provisions within
the framework of a crisis in women's reproductive health care. See Brief of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical Women's
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Public Health
Association, the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals, the National League
for Nursing, and the National Medical Association as Amici Curiae in Support of the
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and the health of prenatal life pregnant women choose to carry to term. As
Reva Siegel argues, "[s]tate action on behalf of the fetus in utero must find
its constitutional bearings, and constraints, in the community's relation to
the citizen in whom unborn life resides."''
In contrast to the feminist
proposals considered below, this Article urges that privacy should feature
prominently in explicating that relation.
III. FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The origins of privacy jurisprudence, in such notions as the "right to
be let alone" and the image of man in his castle,'4 2 suggest certain
avenues for feminist critique. Such imagery evokes for some the history of
public toleration of domestic violence and sexual assault in the home,' 43
leading such feminists as Catharine MacKinnon to call the right to privacy
the right of men to abuse women in private.'4 4 Women, she argues, are
deprived of precisely what privacy secures for men: an inviolate personality."'45 From this standpoint,
one might well regard such privacy as an
146
illusion for women.
Yet the response to that problem need not be an abandonment of
privacy's goals of personhood and autonomy; to the contrary, women need
privacy all the more.14 7 Consider, for example, the role that recognition
of the danger which domestic violence poses to millions of married women
played in the Casey joint opinion's affirmance of women's decisional
privacy with respect to their husbands. Indeed, precisely in the context of
domestic violence, Elizabeth Schneider argues for the positive potential of
privacy understood as personhood, liberty, freedom, and autonomy. 4 8 As
Dorothy Roberts has written in defense of privacy rights for women of
color, "affirming Black women's constitutional claim to personhood is
particularly important because these women historically have been denied
Petitioners at 10-13, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91744, 91-902). On women's reproductive health needs, see Rutherford, supra note 91,
at 283-84 (describing proposed Women's Health Equity Act).
'4'
Siegel, supra note 27, at 380.
142 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193, 195, 205, 220 (1890); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143 See Schneider, supra note 57, at 974.
44 MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 101-02.
145 Id.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 86-93 for a discussion of funding cases.
141
See Allen, supra note 25, at 180.
141 See Schneider, supra note 57, at 975, 994-98.
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the dignity of their full humanity and identity."' Moreover, both Roberts
and Schneider argue for affirmative governmental obligations or actions to
help women secure what privacy protects.150
As noted above, many legal commentators, including feminists, have
criticized the Supreme Court's grounding .ofthe right to choose abortion in
privacy instead of equality.' 5' This Article does not argue against an
equality analysis, but instead considers a different strand of feminist critique
which echoes some of the above themes but which emphasizes the atomistic
nature of privacy. This critique faults privacy for failing to recognize the
connectedness of women's lives by casting abortion as an adversarial
dilemma of competing rights rather than conflicting responsibilities.'
For example, Ruth Colker charges that feminist organizations which make
autonomy arguments in abortion litigation are really making atomistic
privacy arguments.' 3 Robin West argues that pro-choice litigants'
embrace of the logic of rights reinforces the association of abortion with

149 Roberts, supra note 91, at 1468. Citing Roberts' work, the NAACP
Brief urged
the Court that: " or poor women, and particularly for poor African American women,
the right to privacy in matters of body and reproduction-a right that was trammeled
with state sanction during centuries of slavery-is fundamental to notions of freedom
and liberty." Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and
Other Organizations as Amici Curiaein Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania at 9, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744,
91-902); see also Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 414 (1987) (on role of rights

assertion in finding the self).

S0 See Roberts, supra note 91, at 1476-81; Schneider, supra note 57, at 994-98;
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
'5' See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 82, at 117-26 (characterizing sexual equality
analysis
as main alternative to privacy and describing shift by commentators and some members

of Court to equality analysis). For an often-cited explication of the sex equality

argument for abortion rights, see Law, supra note 32. For more recent statements, see
Tribe, supra note 24, § 15-10, at 1353-54; Siegel, supra note 27; see also MacKinnon,
supra note 13, and, for a fuller exposition, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281 (1991). For the influence of the sex equality
argument on the Caseyjoint opinion, where it is more apparent than in Roe, see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
'5 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 64-105 (1982). Gilligan reported that
the women in her study of the abortion decision saw a "justice" or "rights" approach "as
a distortion and a deformation of the situation" because it leaves out issues of connection
and attachment. See Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation,
34 Buff. L. Rev. 11, 39 (1985). She found instead that women asked "in effect, whether
it is responsible or irresponsible, moral or immoral, to sustain and deepen an attachment

under circumstances in which [they] cannot be, for whatever reason, responsible, and in
which [they] cannot exercise care." Id. at 38; see also Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood:
Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1325 (1990).
113 For responses to Colker, see Bums, supra note 23; Naomi
R. Cahn, Defining
Feminist Litigation, 14 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1991).
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irresponsibility.154
She has called for "public-regarding" arguments
explaining the responsibilities that the right to abortion entails.'
Both Colker and West are motivated by the desire to combat images of
women who seek abortion as selfish and irresponsible and to persuade the
public that women deserve reproductive freedom.' 6 In assessing their
proposals, I will argue that both undervalue privacy as autonomy and liberty
of conscience and that privacy can capture the notion of women's responsible moral choice while protecting autonomy. Although both proposals were
written in the wake of Webster but prior to Casey, it is useful to think about
them in light of, if not as alternatives to, a "revised Roe."

A. Colker's Communitarian Critique
1. Colker's Conception of Feminist Litigation
Describing herself as a "religious feminist" interested in dialogue,
Colker, in recent articles, asks whether feminists have been making truly
feminist arguments in litigation concerning reproductive freedom. 5 7 She
argues that the traditional pro-choice argument about individual autonomy
and privacy is not the best feminist argument that feminists can make.' 5 8
Such argument gives abortion opponents the higher moral ground, Colker
claims, because they appear to be concerned about social welfare, not just
liberal individualism. She urges feminists to make more communitarian
West, supra note 17, at 81-82; see infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
West, supra note 17, at 84.
156 See Colker, Reply to Sarah Bums, 13 Harv. Women's L.J. 207, 207 n.3; West,
supra note 17, at 82.
157
Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 137-42; see also Colker, Feminism,
Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1046-47. Colker offers her ideas on abortion
in Feminism, Theology, and Abortion as tentative and not fully worked out. See id. at
1074. I draw on that article mainly to fill in the content of similar ideas in Feminist
Litigation.
's Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 165-68. While Colker does not
think that a convincing non-atomistic privacy argument has yet been made, she does not
rule it out as a possibility. See id. at 181-82 n.136. In fact, Colker has since indicated
no objection to a privacy argument made in conjunction with an equal protection
argument, since a "liberty/privacy argument would emphasize the right of each
individual to make informed decisions about appropriate medical treatment," and seems
particularly suited to such issues as access to RU 486. See Ruth Colker, An Equal
Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age,
and Class, 1991 Duke L.J. 324, 324 n.1 [hereinafter Colker, Equal Protection]; cf. Ruth
Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of a Group Based Theory
for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, I Law & Ineq. J. 191 (1983) (describing failure of
privacy doctrine to protect against abuses of women's sexuality).
154

155
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arguments that are "pro-woman, viewing women as interconnected members
of society, rather than5 9pro-choice, viewing each woman as an atomized
individual in society."'1
Colker suggests that a good faith, "pro-woman" argument about
abortion must include both respect for the well-being of women and respect
for the value of prenatal life.' 60 With respect to the first prong, based on
her study of Webster, Colker sweepingly claims that, with the exception of
amicus briefs filed by women of color and on behalf of juvenile women, a
focus on women's well-being has been obscured by the pro-choice focus on
privacy.' 6' Indeed, she claims that "[t]he Roe privacy argument easily
allowed the result in Harrisv. McRae to occur because it was embedded in
an individualistic rather than a communitarian framework.', 162 To satisfy
the second prong, Colker puzzlingly suggests that we "let in" the fetus to the
argument by showing that women value prenatal life.' 63 Thus, while
acknowledging that a liberty of conscience defense of privacy is an attempt
to "salvage it" from being atomistic, she concludes that in order to make
such a defense credible, we need a "communitarian, woman-centered
perspective that considers a woman's responsibility to her fetus in a
nonatomistic way.' 64 In attempting to move away from a competing
rights analysis that pits the rights of a woman against the rights of a fetus,
Colker also believes that her alternative approach will "persuade people that
pregnant women are the people most likely to protect life in all of its forms"
and hence that "[i]t is they ... who deserve decision-making responsibility
65
for reproductive choices."'
Colker seems to envision that feminists should be open to talking about
'5 Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 167. Colker's vision of feminism
as dialogic and of women as interconnected does not invoke Gilligan, although
McDonnell, upon whom Colker relies, does. See McDonnell, supra note 115, at 37-38.
Instead, Colker offers insights from religious sources. See Colker, Feminist Litigation,
supra note 16, at 142-44; see also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra
note 16, at 10 11-30.
60 Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 161. While Colker advocates her
two-pronged argument to defend a right to abortion, a number of opponents of the
rhetoric of choice who favor dramatically restricting or eliminating abortion insist upon
the harmony of protecting women and protecting potential life. Consider, for example,
a recent newspaper advertisement, "A New American Compact: Caring About Women,
Caring for the Unborn," signed by a group of academics, politicians, and Feminists for
Life of America. See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1992, at A23.
161 Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 174-78.
162 Id. at 177.
163 Id. at 180-82.
'64 Id. at 181. The context of this statement is Colker's criticism of the appellee's
use of cases striking down regulation of pregnant women's conduct during pregnancy.
165 Colker, supra note 156, at 213.
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valuing prenatal life, but that the burden of valuing such life should rest
with the state. Colker also insists that the state respect the well-being of
women and finds public funding restrictions to be disrespectful of women.' 66 Similarly, Colker would support a stronger government commitment to sex education, contraception availability, and emphasis upon men's
responsibility to use contraception. In essence, Colker's proposed argument
against abortion restrictions is that, while the state has good reason to value
prenatal life, at this point in our history we cannot trust the state adequately
to respect the well-being of women.' 67 Her argument against state
regulation, and indeed her defense of abortion, is contingent-she suggests
that when the state demonstrates a consistent record of respect for women,
we can delegate to it the power to protect prenatal -life. 6 ' Colker's
proposed argument would be a group-based equality argument that focuses
on the negative impact of the restriction of abortion on the lives of women,
particularly poor women, women of color, and teenaged women.' 6 9
In subsequent elaboration, Colker has proposed a "reproductive health
perspective" that."considers the full consequences of a woman's reproductive capacity and sexual behavior" and "the larger socioeconomic circumstances surrounding pregnancy."' 7 Granting the importance of focusing
on "reproductive health" and on particularly vulnerable groups such as
teenaged women, there are still some unresolved questions and troubling
implications posed by Colker's "pro-woman," rather than "pro-choice,"
argument, with its twin notions of women's well-being and valuing fetal
life. They are of particular concern in view of Casey's declarations that a
state may advance its interest in protecting potential life throughout pregnancy so long as it does not impose undue burdens.

'"
167

See Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 146-48, 165.

See id. at 165.

Id. On contingency, compare Alison Jaggar, Abortion and a Woman's Right to
Decide, 5 Phil. F. 347 (1974) with Petchesky, supra note 82, at 399-401.
See Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 174-78. In deriving her group169
based equality argument, Colker invokes Zillah Eisenstein's argument that feminist
theory is implicitly group-based and thus cannot be embedded in liberal individualism
because it necessarily recognizes that women are a sex-class. See id. at 157 (citing
Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (1981)).
.70Colker, Equal Protection, supra note 158, at 329. According to Colker, such a
perspective would discuss
161

the nature of sexual activity (e.g., whether it is consensual), the use and
availability of contraceptives, the availability of pre- and post-natal care, the

socioeconomic and physical consequences of motherhood, the socioeconomic
status and physical health of the child that is born, the availability of adoption,
as well as the availability and consequences of abortion.
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2. Questions About Women's Well-Being and
Responsibilities
First, Colker seeks to offer an "anti-essentialist" perspective, 7' but
is her vision of women, of feminism and feminist argument, and of the
value of dialogue, an attractive or appropriate vision for all women? Her
own aspirational view of women, inspired by theology, is of women having
"responsibilities in this world to nurture love and life," although such
responsibilities must be allocated by society respectfully. 72 As "connected selves," she argues, "we have no claim to act in ways to protect our
bodily integrity in isolation from society."' 173 In turn, women's right to
abortion is tied to their need to protect their own well-being. With respect
to feminist argument about abortion, she faults a failure to acknowledge
women's interconnected responsibilities, including a pregnant woman's
responsibilities to her fetus, or, evocative of the Casey joint opinion, to
acknowledge the consequences of a woman's decision upon others. By
apparently rejecting an autonomy-based defense of abortion, Colker
inadequately values the vision of feminism as entailing liberty of conscience,
self-determination, and meaningful choice about reproduction. As Sarah
Burns points out, "feminism is neither necessarily a celebration nor a
rejection of women's cultures and norms. It is, however, always a rejection
of women's subjugation.' 74 Second, who defines such notions as responsibility and interconnected responsibilities and what is their content?
Colker does not offer a general account of a woman's obligation to her
fetus, but faults pro-choice feminists' reliance on arguments that our
constitutional framework does not force on women physical subordination
and exceptional samaritanism with respect to the fetus. She claims that such
feminists fail to recognize "that a pregnant -woman may have obligations to
others, including [her] fetus" and, indeed, that "we may want to live in a
world in which we have interconnected responsibilities to each other."' 75
But should such responsibilities be legally enforced? Although Colker

172

173

See id. at 325-28.
Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1050.

Id.

17"Bums, supra note 23, at 195.
'71 Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 180-81.
Colker is criticizing the
amicus brief of NOW as well as the amicus brief of Catholics for a Free Choice. In
fact, it has been argued that placing abortion law in the context of the law of
samaritanism is one of the most powerful arguments against state restriction of abortion.
See Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979) (acknowledging debt to Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47
(1971)).
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would insist on fair allocation of the burden of valuing life, would recognition of interconnected responsibilities put women at risk of uneven
application or enforcement of such responsibilities? While such responsibilities may remain merely hortatory for some people, women, even with
access to abortifacient contraception, depend on medical assistance to
terminate pregnancy. Thus, women might be compelled to be Good Samaritans to fetuses, while such self-sacrifice would not automatically be required
of others. 76 Casey suggests the continuing power of arguments premised
on bodily integrity and on women's liberty to choose precisely because of
the physical impact of pregnancy upon women.' 77 While Colker insists
that women may not be disproportionately burdened, she does not accept as
a general point a person's right to bodily integrity "in isolation from
society."'"" As discussed below, Colker's communitarian notions of wellbeing and valuing life lead to a goal of preserving fetal life so long as
women are free to terminate pregnancy.
Third, would Colker's view of women's well-being sufficiently protect
decisional autonomy? She supports more regulation of abortion than the
Roe Court permitted. Colker faults Roe and Akron for adopting an overly
medical view of women's health and not permitting states to protect such
aspects of women's well-being as "the conflicting emotional and moral
issues that a woman must resolve in deciding whether to have an abortion."' 7 9 Noting women's reports of adverse psychological consequences
due to abortion-reports similar to those cited in some of the briefs before
the Casey court 8°0 and concluding that women need "to be confronted
with conflicting opinions about the abortion decision and to have a safe
place in which to consider them," Colker believes the Court should
"encourage states to develop programs that could improve a woman's
deliberative process about abortion."' 1 But Colker's vision of desirable
176 See Suzanna Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1591 (1989); Tribe, supra
note 24, § 15-10, at 1354-55; Tribe, supra note 35, at 130-35. I have elsewhere posited
that one might argue for a duty to rescue while also defending abortion rights. See
McClain, supra note 14, at 1256-62.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 44-50, 97-103.
178 Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1050.

Id. at 1062.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Colker is critical of the Webster
amicus brief filed by Feminists for Life of America (akin to its brief filed in Casey) for
its stereotypes of women and because "the brief seems to assume that all women would
choose to bring their pregnancies to term if their consciousnesses were raised," but
nonetheless takes seriously women's reports of feeling pressured in their decisions and
lacking adequate information. Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 170-72; see
also McDonnell, supra note 115, at 33-41.
' Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1066-67; see id.
179

80
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counseling is not the mandatory informed consent and waiting period
provisions upheld in Casey. To the contrary, Colker opposes such
provisions because they are coercive and intended to eliminate abortion
rather than to further reflective choice.1 2 Colker's picture of a desirable
counseling scheme is closer to what Dworkin imagines the Casey court
approves-a process by which women are encouraged to know philosophic
arguments. Colker suggests requiring all health care providers to make
available voluntary counseling sessions for pregnant women and their
partners, whether the women plan to continue or to terminate their
pregnancies, to be run by trained ethicists, in which the issues considered
would include, inter alia, "the meaning or value of the fetus' life."' 3 On
her aspirational view of feminism and women's well-being, she notes the
risks of a wrong decision, and suggests: "Rather than simply acquiescing
to any abortion decision made by a woman, we might want to consider how
we can improve her qualitative judgment."'" 4 Such a notion may indeed
be appropriate among friends or among people who consider themselves
linked in a community; guaranteeing decisional privacy with respect to the
state does not preclude such evaluation and consultation. In the current
climate, however, one must express serious reservations about the identity
of the "we" and ask whether government involvement is necessary or could
transcend the persuasion model upheld in Casey.
3. Questions About "Valuing Life"
What does valuing prenatal life mean and how might the state value it?
Is it merely what Dworkin calls respect for the "intrinsic value of human
life"? 85 How is it related to the well-being of women? 8 6 Colker contends that within a more communitarian framework, we would not have to
balance women's right to choose with the state's interest in preserving fetal
at 1063-66 (citing Reardon, supra note 115, at 1-26, 138-41).
182 See personal correspondence with Ruth Colker (Aug. 17, 1992) (on file with
author); see also Brief of Amici CuriaeNational Black Women's Health Project [et al.],
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1953) (Colker identified as
attorney for amici curiae; on file with author).

Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1067.
Id. at 1063. For the expression of similar concern with establishing a supportive
community within which women can explore issues relating to the abortion decision, see
McDonnell, supra note 115, at 38-41.
185 Dworkin, supra note 56, at 396-97.
16 With respect to adolescents, Colker properly condemns as irresponsible
governmental policy "blindly encouraging childbirth among the group that can ill afford
unintended and unwanted pregnancies." Colker, Equal Protection, supra note 158, at
364.
183
14
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life. Instead, she suggests that "we might consider the ways in which the
state could protect both the women's well-being and the state's interest in
preserving prenatal life, rather than incorrectly assume that the woman's
choice of abortion has no effect on society or others."' 7 Here, again, one
is reminded of the Casey joint opinion's attention to the effects of a
woman's decision upon others, including the consequences for the fetus.'88
The critical point in Colker's argument is that abortion can be separated
morally (if not practically) into a woman's right no longer to be pregnant,
which Colker grants, and a woman's right to insist upon the termination of
the potential life of a fetus, which Colker insists a woman has no moral
right to do.' 89 She suggests women seek abortion to terminate pregnancy
and to value their own lives, not because they are "anti-fetal life," and that
such a termination decision "cannot be grounded in disrespect or disregard
for the life of the fetus."' 90 Under current science, the implications of
such splitting would be confined largely to the post-viability context,
although she speculates as to how in the future such a split might result in
preserving fetal life while permitting abortion at earlier stages in pregnancy. 9 '
Although Colker splits the abortion right to support her claim that there
may be ways to permit women to terminate pregnancy (thus promoting
women's well-being) and to preserve prenatal life (valuing life), one must
recognize that opponents of legal abortion use the technological possibility
of separating "the unborn child" from "any particular woman" in order to
advance the claim that neither the viability nor the birth line is of any
significance for "personhood" and that the unborn child is as much a person
in the womb as outside of it. 192 At its most extreme, such logic makes use
of technology such as embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood to
demonstrate "the fundamental biological independence of the newly
conceived child from any particular woman" and treats intrauterine gestation
..
7 Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 166-67.

See supra text accompanying note 102.
See Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 166. Laurence Tribe has also
explored the splitting of abortion into the right no longer to be pregnant and the right
to terminate the life of the fetus. See Tribe, supra note 35, at 222-28. But see Estrich
& Sullivan, supra note 49, at 146 ("By definition, [a pregnant woman's] right is to
88

189

control her bodily autonomy even at the expense of potential human life.").

0 Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 16, at 1055, 1059.
See id. at 1055-60; Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 16, at 166-67; see
also Tribe, supra note 35, at 221-23 (discussing impact of reproductive technology on
ideas of fetal viability).
'92 See Brief of Catholics United for Life [et al.] as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents and Cross-Petitioners at 18-19, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
'9'
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as "merely an intermediate stage subject to technical manipulation regarding
both its duration and the identity of the woman who bears the child.' 93
Would a vision of interconnected responsibilities support a view that
prenatal life is a creature or ward of the state so that, from a communitarian
perspective, the state's interest in preserving potential life justifies preserving and raising even pre-viable prenatal life? 94 Should or could artificial
wombs be developed or volunteer women be recruited as incubators so that
a pregnant woman who did not wish to carry a fetus to term would have to
surrender even a pre-viable conceptus or fetus for incubation elsewhere?' 95
At the risk of sounding irreverent, one might well ask, "whose prenatal life
is it, anyway?"' 96 Would the state's interest justify developing and
insisting on pre-viability abortion methods designed to preserve the fetus,
even if such methods created greater health risks and costs for a wom-

' Id.; cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It
Makes, 2 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 2 n.3 (1992) (describing, as example of technological elimination of biological differences between women and men, reports on technology

that would alter biological capacities of men so they could carry fetus).
194
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 n.2 (1976), the Court
declined (on standing grounds) to decide the constitutionality of a statutory provision
declaring an infant who survives "an attempted abortion which was not performed to
save the life or health of the mother" an abandoned ward of the state and that the
mother (or father, if he consented) "shall have no parental rights or obligations
whatsoever relating to such infant."
9' In his discussion of splitting the abortion right, Tribe acknowledges that the
prospect of artificial wombs "raises justified fears about a Brave New World of state-run
baby farms, including the specter of state control over the disposition of fetuses that are
not wanted by their biological parents but that develop under state command into viable
infants, some of them perhaps badly handicapped." Tribe, supra note 35, at 227.
Anti-abortion groups have increasingly sought alliances with groups representing
people with disabilities, playing on the ambivalence that some persons with disabilities
feel toward selective abortion in the case of a fetus with disabilities. See Steven A.
Holmes, Abortion Issue Divides Advocates for Disabled, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1991, at
All.
196 Consider Davis v. Davis, No. 92-34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 1, 1992), in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court protected the genetic father from the genetic
mother's attempt to donate frozen pre-embryos to childless couples. The Court
concluded, in view of the "profound impact" such donation would have upon the gamete
providers who would be, at least, genetic parents, that the progenitors should retain "sole
decisional authority as to whether the process of attempting to gestate these preembryos
should continue." Id. at 15. The Court held that, in case of conflict, "ordinarily, the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail." Id. at 17. The Court distinguished
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), because it involved a pregnancy
inside the woman's body. Id. at 14. Colker disagrees with the Davis decision, faulting
the court's failure to consider the physical effort and pain the woman endured. See
personal correspondence with Ruth Colker (Aug. 17, 1992) (on file with author).
Obviously, arguing against the splitting that Colker proposes raises questions about why
women, and not men, should have a right not to be the source of children if they
(voluntarily) engage in sex, if the differential of pregnancy were eliminated.
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an?' 97 Under a communitarian perspective, who would be expected to
care for the children developed from such fetuses? Colker does not appear
to advocate government rearing of children nor does she view adoption as
a "panacea for the need for abortion."' '
What, then, is the practical
meaning and scope of valuing prenatal life? And may women do so without
posing dangers to their self-determination?
The notion of decisional privacy in bearing or begetting a child does
not seem to support the state acting as a repository for prenatal life and
children that individuals have decided they cannot or do not wish to bear or
parent. Ironically, a feminism rooted in a belief in relationship and
interconnectedness seemingly would make the prenatal life the property of
the entire community and not a part of the woman.
In Griswold, the Court invoked such cases as Meyer v. Nebraska and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court held that parents have the
right to direct their children's education and that the government has no
power to attempt to standardize its children or to foster a homogeneous people.' 9 9 Tribe suggests that those cases, also invoked in Casey as establishing "that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood,"200 are the
immediate ancestors of the liberty invoked by women when they insist on
a right not to be made mothers against their will.2 ' Tribe suggests that
such precedents mean that the state cannot shackle individuals with selfdefining decisions and therefore women cannot be made "mere instrumentalities of the state."2 If a woman is forced to surrender prenatal life, a part
of herself, for societal adoption is she not made such an instrumentality?

197 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding provisions
requiring that second physician be present at abortion of viable fetus and take reasonable
steps to provide care to "child born as a result of the abortion" and forbidding use of
abortion procedure fatal to viable fetus unless alternative procedures posed greater risk
to health of woman). In discussing such regulations with respect to pre-viable prenatal

life, Estrich and Sullivan argue that they would only increase the cost of abortion

without any countervailing benefits to the fetus other than discouraging abortion. See
Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 49, at 147.
9
Colker, Equal Protection, supra note 158, at 351. Contrast a statement by anti-

abortion activist Betsy Hart on Larry King Live that there are two million childless
couples waiting to adopt children, including "minority" babies and babies with Down's

Syndrome.

See Larry King Live, The Republican Party's Position on Abortion,

Transcript #613 (CNN, July 24, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
'00Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2806.
201 See Tribe, supra note 35, at 92-93; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 741-44.
202 Tribe, supra note 35, at 102-04 (citing Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 788, 790).
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Finally, how contingent is the abortion right? 203 Should the state's
interest in valuing life take the form of independently "bearing" fetuses and
rearing children or of removing socioeconomic and other constraints causing
women to choose abortion rather than childbirth? As Colker elaborates it,
a reproductive health perspective, focusing on why pregnancy is unwanted,
would seek to meet women's needs connected with choosing to continue
pregnancy and to raise children.20 4 Considered in this light, the informed
consent scheme upheld in Casey seeks to inform women of public and
private agencies ready to help them continue their pregnancies and to raise
their children, or to give them up for adoption.20 5
But would Colker's notion of balancing women's well-being and fetal
life support restrictions on women's right to choose abortion, either if
government makes a commitment to address the socioeconomic constraints
making particular pregnancies and childrearing unwanted, or if government
associates) 2 6 stood ready to
or citizens (or indeed a woman's 2intimate
7
assume the burdens of childrearing?
Colker is correct, and not alone, in calling for a reproductive health
perspective. 2 8 Her insistence on governmental. respect for the well-being
of women becomes especially important in light of Casey's protection of
state "persuasion" of women to continue pregnancies. Indeed, in a world
of a revised Roe, one could well understand that some advocates of
reproductive freedom might look longingly at certain European abortion
laws which, although expressing the state's respect for life and informing
pregnant women of alternatives to abortion (including greater state support
for families than here in the United States), nonetheless fund abortions and
do not exclude them from public facilities. Yet Colker's notions of wellbeing and valuing life, and of women's interconnected responsibilities,

See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying text. A full analysis of this question,
and feminist debate on this issue, is outside the scope of this Article.
204 See Colker, Equal Protection, supra note 158, at 328-31.
205 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822, 2824; see also NARAL, Who Decides? A Stateby-State Review of Abortion Rights (3d ed. 1992) (listing proposed informed consent
legislation).
206 Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2870 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) (in enacting
husband notification requirement, state could rationally believe that resulting discussion
could obviate perceived problems such as economic constraints or husband's previously
expressed opposition to having children).
207 Consider an unsuccessful legislative proposal in Wyoming to fund a pregnant
woman's expenses provided she first indicate intent to turn her child over for adoption,
and requiring that she reimburse the state if she later decides to keep the child. See
NARAL, supra note 205, at 140.
208 See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 91 (focusing on concerns of African-American
203

women).
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coupled with her criticism of autonomy and of traditional pro-choice
arguments about self-determination, may not offer adequate limiting
principles to her perspective.
B. West's Notion of Abortion as a Facet of "Reproductive Responsibility": From "Taking Rights Seriously" to
"Taking Responsibilities Seriously"
1. Responsibility Versus Rights
In Foreword.- Taking FreedomSeriously, West casts abortion as a facet
of "reproductive responsibility." She claims that reproductive freedom can
best be justified and secured by a responsibility-based argument that more
accurately reflects the experience of women than does a rights-based
approach. °9 Written in the wake of Webster and Hodgson v. Minnesota2t 0 and inspired by poet and former Czechoslovakian President Vaclav
Havel's writings about freedom, which West claims present a responsibilitybased vision of liberalism, her proposed shift to responsibility is in part
strategic and therefore assumes shrinking judicial protection of individual
rights and a need to secure freedom through legislatures. If the Casey
dissenters had secured the one more vote needed to leave reproductive
freedom entirely to the realm of "citizens trying to persuade each other and
then voting," as Scalia proposes it should be,"' then West's proposal
would have an even greater urgency. Nevertheless, in light of Casey's
recasting of the right of privacy as not insulating a woman from state
persuasions, certain aspects of her proposal retain considerable interest,
particularly her claims concerning declining public support for rights
because of their insulation of the right-holder and her invitation to focus on
societal failures as reasons why women need abortions.
A rights approach, West argues, insulates the abortion decision from
public scrutiny. Doing so, she contends, has a cost: "it obfuscates the
moral quality of most abortion decisions. 2t 2 She claims:
The overriding "insulating" logic of rights, generally embraced
209 West, supra note 17, at 84. West states that such an argument "would justify
rather than supplant the rights-based claim of Roe." Id. Elsewhere I have developed
this critique of West's responsibility-based justification of reproductive freedom. See
McClain, supra note 14, at 1244-56.
210 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
2
Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
212 West, supra note 17, at 81.
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by the pro-choice movement, that rights insulate conduct and the
actor from scrutiny so that they can better protect the "worst of
us" as well as the "worst in us" may reinforce the damaging
misperception that the demand for abortion reflects the irresponsible worst of us and worst within

US.213

In contrast, under a rights and responsibility analysis, support for reproductive freedom would "rest on the demonstrated capacity of pregnant women
to decide whether to carry a fetus [to term] or to abort responsibly"; the
"moral quality of the underlying decision" is what "insulates [it] from
scrutiny."

4

Under West's proposed alternative to traditional "atomistic" privacy
talk, "women need the freedom to make reproductive decisions, not merely
to vindicate a right to be left alone but often to strengthen ties to others
[and] to plan responsibly," for example, to "have a family for which they
can provide, to pursue professional or work commitments made to the
outside world, or to continue supporting their families or communities."2 5
West views those reasons, among others, as removing the decision from "an
egoistic private vacuum."2 6 She claims that "[w]hatever the reason, the
decision to abort is almost invariably made within a web of interlocking,
competing, and often irreconcilable responsibilities and commitments. 2 7
Furthermore, she distinguishes abortion from murder, not on the
nominal and question-begging difference between a 'fetus' and
a 'baby,' but rather in the moral quality of the underlying
decision ....

Unlike the homicidal decision to take another's

life, the decision to abort is more often than not a morally
responsible decision. The abortion decision typically rests not on
a desire to destroy fetal life but on a responsible and moral desire
to ensure that a new life will be borne only if it will be nurtured
and loved.218

Id. at 82. Although she offers no examples, perhaps West has in mind Justice
Stevens' point regarding protecting individual liberty despite the risk of "incorrect
decisions." See supra note 125. I have argued elsewhere that West's critique of prochoice litigants (she cites NARAL as an exception) is unfair and belied by the history
of abortion litigation; I will not repeat that criticism here. See McClain, supra note 14,
at 1246-51. However, the Casey litigation offers an illustration of painstaking effort to
present empirical evidence of the practical impact of abortion regulations upon the lives
of women. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103, 126-32.
214 West, supra note 17, at 82-83.
213

215

Id. at 84-85.

Id. at 85.
Id.
211 Id. at 83 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Aida Torres & Jacqueline D.
Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 Fam. Plan. Persp. 169 (1988)). In
216

217
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In West's analysis of reproductive freedom, the concept of responsibility appears to mean autonomy in the sense of self-determination and
moral independence. Thus, West states that "support for expanded
reproductive freedom should rest on the claim that only by accepting that
responsibility to make those judgments do women manifest their freedom
to pursue their authentically chosen and desired life goals."2'19 As argued
in part II, defenders of the right to privacy, far from justifying privacy
because it isolates the individual for the sake of isolation, often speak the
language of moral responsibility and self-determination. Notwithstanding
West's charge, pro-choice litigants have focused on women's moral
independence, not as a license to irresponsibility but as tied to their
personhood and full participation in society, an association strongly reflected
in the Casey joint opinion."' It is not clear that West's responsibilitybased analysis accomplishes anything that notions of rights, autonomy, and
privacy do not. To the extent it does, given the growing prominence of
such notions of responsibility and irresponsibility in discussions about sex,
the family, abortion, and social welfare, it may prove difficult to cabin and
may endanger women's reproductive freedom.22 1
2. Responsibility, "Insulation," and the "Vicissitudes" of
Public Opinion
Under West's responsibility and rights analysis, "[l]ike all freedoms,
[reproductive freedom's] security would rest on citizens' understanding that
it is deserved, rather than on the legalistic ground that it is a right simply
possessed regardless of the contrary whims or convictions of the commu-

support, West cites Gilligan's assertion that women contemplate abortion as posing its
moral issues in terms of responsibility, not rights. Id. (citing Gilligan, supra note 152,
at 64-105). But a number of the 29 women who formed the basis of Gilligan's study
reported that they viewed abortion as murder, yet nonetheless felt compelled to have an
abortion because of their own circumstances. See Gilligan, supra note 152, at 85, 125.
For an interpretation of the phenomenon of women viewing abortion in general as
murder, while justifying it in their own particular cases, see Petchesky, supra note 82,
at 368-79; infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
219

220
221

West, supra note 17, at 83.
See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-09; supra notes 30, 200.
I have argued elsewhere that West's suggestions that society be invited to focus

on the moral quality of women's abortion decisions, as well as to accept a collective
responsibility for unwanted pregnancy, raise a number of potential problems-both as

to who is the proper locus of decision making and whether a woman will be required

to satisfy some test to show that she truly faces irreconcilable responsibilities. See
McClain, supra note 14, at 1251-54.
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nity. ''222 I have elsewhere argued that West does not clearly indicate how
such a demonstration would be made: whether by reading into the legislative record empirical or moral literature about women's decision making or
by evaluating women's decisions on a case-by-case basis.223 In either
case, West's argument that reproductive freedom would be better defended
by inviting society to focus on the moral quality of a woman's abortion
decision overlooks the highly controversial nature of the abortion issue and
the role of people's convictions about family, religion, and the like in their
opposition to abortion.224 Furthermore, it does not grapple with the
tenacity in the Court's abortion jurisprudence--only enhanced by Casey's
sanction of state persuasion-of the concept of the state's interest in
protecting potential life and in "normal childbirth" nor with the unceasing
efforts of state legislatures to further that interest.
Thus, West's argument that the true distinction between abortion and
murder lies not in the "question-begging distinction between a 'fetus' and
a 'baby,"' but in the moral quality of women's decisions, invites two
immediate criticisms. First, West underestimates the role of a belief in
"fetal personhood" held by a certain politically mobilized segment of the
population (manifest in the Republican platform225 ) as well as the strength
of a more general sympathy for the particular vulnerability of prenatal life
found in many who oppose abortion.226 In the face of a belief in fetal
personhood, it seems doubtful that any argument about women's reasons for
needing an abortion will persuade those who, for reasons often deeply
rooted in religious faith, believe abortion is murder 27 and that a pregnant
woman is a "mother" killing her "baby., 228 Further, even under a
West, supra note 17, at 83.
See McClain, supra note 14, at 1252-53.
224 See infra text accompanying notes 231-39.
225 See David E. Rosenbaum, The Platform: Party Takes More Conservative Stance
Than Bush, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1992, at A16.
226 See Petchesky, supra note 82, at 241-76, 335-45 (describing role of religious
belief in "fetal personhood" in opposition to abortion); see also Joan Williams, Gender
Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559, 1585
(1991) (arguing public has bonded with fetus).
227 Of course, a privacy argument faces a similar problem here.
228 A survey of newspaper accounts of the protests staged by Operation Rescue not
only at the abortion clinic in Wichita but in a number of cities across the country during
August 1991 leaves no doubt as to the belief, as a matter of religious faith, in the
personhood of the fetus in the adamant opposition to abortion. In press accounts,
spokespersons for Operation Rescue consistently referred to prenatal life as "children"
and "babies" and to pregnant women as "moms" and "mothers." In a memorable
declaration, the Reverend Pat Robertson, television evangelist and former Republican
presidential hopeful, reportedly told a rally of protesters in Wichita, "'We will not rest
until every baby in the United States is safe in his mother's womb."' On Land, In the
222
223

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 3:1

constitutional regime in which the fetus is not a constitutional person, Casey
serves as a reminder ofjust how much concern for "potential life" drives the
issue, despite women's rights to liberty and autonomy. Therefore, far from
being persuaded as to the validity of women's reasons, the public, instead,
through democratically-elected legislatures, may attempt to persuade women
that they should continue their pregnancies and not choose abortion.
Admittedly, those absolutely opposed to all abortion are a small percentage
of the population, but larger segments of the population premise approval
or disapproval of abortion upon the stage of pregnancy, as well as the
reasons for which it is sought.2 29
Second, contrary to West's argument, reproductive freedom would be
especially vulnerable if it depended upon women being able to convince the
majority of the appropriateness or, better still, the "responsible" and moral
quality of their decision. This difficulty can be demonstrated by mapping
the various reasons West gives (and which studies indicate women give) as
to why women have abortions and the reasons that polls indicate various
majorities approve or disapprove as motivations for having an abortion. 30
Granting that any attempt to use or interpret public opinion polls is fraught
with peril, it is by no means clear that the reasons West characterizes as
" '
moral and responsiblewould be accepted as such by various majorities.23
It would seem that, since Roe, a clear majority of the population has
favored legal abortion yet expressed reservations about specific reasons for
having an abortion.232 In other words, on the legal or political question
of whether government should restrict abortion or intervene in a woman's
decision, "overwhelming majorities of every demographic group" agree that
it should be a woman's private choice; on the moral question of when an

Air, Abortion Debate Rages, Chi. Trib., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3 (emphasis added).
229 See Condit, supra note 83, at 147-51.
230 A frequently cited source on the reasons women give for why they have
abortions is Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?,
20 Fam. Plan. Persp. 169 (1988). See also Petchesky, supra note 82, at xxvii n.2,
352-53, 369-79. On public opinion, I draw on cited newspaper polls and on Condit,
supra note 83, at 147-51; Petchesky, supra note 82; Tribe, supra note 35, at 231-32.
231 For example, under West's. analysis, two of the most common reasons given in
Torres and Forrest's study, not being able to afford a baby and problems with relationships or wanting to avoid single parenthood, would make a woman's decision moral, or
responsible. But would the reason even more commonly given, "woman is concerned
about how having a baby could change her life," satisfy a responsibility standard or
instead be subject to criticism as "egoistic"? See Torres & Forrest, supra note 230, at
170.
232 See Petchesky, supra note 82, at x, xxvii n.2 (citing polls). But see Mary Ann
Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 41 (1987) (claiming that "[b]oth before
and after Roe, majorities (consistently around 55 percent) have been opposed to its major
innovation, elective abortion").
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abortion is appropriate, opinion is more divided.233 Public opinion polls
suggest a disparity between the reasons most women get abortions (which
may broadly be called socioeconomic or, one might add, relational) and the
reasons people approve of women getting them (e.g., "dire indications" such
as medical harm to the women or birth defects in the fetus).23 4 Moreover,
some polls indicate such moral disapproval spills over to the belief that
abortion should not be legal in those disapproved circumstances.235
Distressingly, some of the disapproved reasons touch directly on the
well-being of a pregnant woman, and even of a potential child. For
instance, some polls suggest that small majorities think abortion should not
be legal if sought for such reasons as the pregnancy is, and the child would
be, unwanted; the woman is poor or low-income, or otherwise has financial
concerns about having a child; or the woman is unmarried and/or does not
want to marry the father.236 Such reasoning suggests vestiges of the view
of women as properly and solely in the role of maternal self-sacrifice, as
well as the strength of the notion of fetal personhood in opposition to
abortion.237 In the face of such opposition, reasons such as a woman's
conclusion that she is "unready for responsibility," is "not mature enough,"
is "too young to have a child," or that she "can't afford baby now" seem,
sadly, unlikely to be persuasive.238

233 See Petchesky, supra note 82, at xxvii n.2, 352-53, 369-70; see also Tribe, supra
note 35, at 172-91. On this point, consider polls indicating that a majority of persons

surveyed accept the proposition that "[e]ven in cases where I might think abortion is the
wrong thing to do, I don't think the government has any business preventing a woman
from having an abortion." See Dionne, supra note 55, at A 18 (reporting that two-thirds
of those surveyed in New York Times/CBS poll agreed with statement quoted).
234 See Petchesky, supra note 82, at 369, 375-76.
Petchesky includes in the
socioeconomic category such reasons as "being too young, too poor, without a job;
needing to finish school; wanting 'to have a life for myself."' Id. at 369. See also
Tribe, supra note 35, at 231-32 (same).
235
See Michael S. Boykin, GOP Should Rewrite Abortion Plank, Atlanta Const.,
July 11, 1992, at A20 (survey of Georgians); Charles Leroux, Facing Facts: Abortions
Cross Racial, Economic, Religious Lines, Chi. Trib., July 5, 1992, at I (Illinois);
American Political Network Abortion Report, supra note 137 (Pennsylvania).
236 See Petchesky, supra note 82, at 369, 375-76; American Political Network
Abortion Report, supra note 137; Boykin, supra note 235; Leroux, supra note 235.
Glendon reports that most Americans disapprove if a woman seeks an abortion "simply"
because she does not want the child. See Glendon, supra note 232, at 41. Such
characterization tellingly underestimates the significance of such a reason. See Born
Unwanted 122-25 (Henry P. David et al. eds., 1988).
237 On this point, consider the battle in Congress in the debate over the Hyde
Amendment as tojust how severe and permanent a health problem pregnant women had
to face as a result of pregnancy in order to fall within the "medical necessity" exception
from the funding bar. See Tribe, supra note 35, at 156.
23 See Torres & Forrest, supra note 230, at 170 (31% of women studied gave as
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As argued below, when weighed against the value of fetal life or
notions of women's proper responsibilities, women's reasons are too easily
dismissed-by ' the public, by judges, and by legislatures-as reasons of
"convenience,
a point driven home by the representation of women's
reasons given in amicus curiae briefs in Casey urging the Court to affirm
the lower court and/or overrule Roe.240 Society should not be invited to
scrutinize women's abortion decisions to see if they are "responsible." As
the Casey court recognizes, the pregnant woman's suffering is hers alone to
bear; she should be the decision maker and should have the liberty to
determine for herself what meanings procreation has for her. Indeed, as the
Casey court reads Roe, the persuasion runs the other way: although a
woman must be the ultimate decision maker, she does not have a right to be
insulated from others, and the state may express profound respect for
potential life and encourage childbirth.
An additional problem with an approach inviting public scrutiny is that
views about the legality and morality of abortion may differ when it is a
case of what Ronald Dworkin has called first-person as distinguished from
third-person ethics.24 ' This distinction explains the frequent disparity
between abstract disapproval of abortion, often on religious grounds, and
evaluation of a personal choice or that made by a friend or relative.242

reason "woman is unready for responsibility"; 30%, "woman is not mature enough, or
is too young to have a child").
239 In his dissent to Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Justice White
characterized the Court's ruling as providing that, prior to viability, "the Constitution of
the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more
than the life or potential life of the fetus." Id. at 221. As discussed above, the most
common reasons given by women in the Torres & Forrest study would probably be
dismissed by Justice White as reasons of "convenience," while among the least common
(fetal or pregnant woman's health problem) would be the more compelling. See supra
text accompanying notes 232-38.
240 See Brief of Amici Curiae of Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Hon. Christopher H. Smith,
Hon. Alan B. Mollohan, Hon. Harold L. Volkmer, Hon. Robert G. Smith and Other
United States Senators and Members of Congress in Support of Respondents at 28-29,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) [hereinafter
Hyde Brief] (claiming abortion has become substitute for birth control and almost never
relates to woman's health); AAPLOG Brief, supra note 121, at 20 (most abortions are
"socioeconomic decisions"). These briefs -cite several of the same sources West uses,
most notably the Torres & Forrest study. See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 121, at 19;
Hyde Brief, supra, at 12, 29.
24' Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in XI The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 1, 81-82 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990).
242 See Petchesky, supranote 82, at 369-70. Conversely, it is not uncommon to find
among those seeking to restrict or outlaw abortion women who had abortions and now
regret their decisions. Organizations such as Women Exploited by Abortion and
Feminists for Life of America stress these themes. Such women sometimes blame
others (or a lack of information) for steering them to choose abortion, and apparently
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Similarly, scholars who have studied women's abortion decisions discern a
situational morality, whereby a woman must reconcile views held in the
abstract about the status of the fetus or a prohibition on taking potential life
with the particularity of her own situation and what pregnancy, childbirth,
and unplanned parenthood would mean for her life and that of the potential
child.243 An example of such situational morality burst into national
political debate in July 1992 when Vice President Quayle, viewed as
resolutely opposed to abortion and supportive of a Republican platform
calling for constitutional protection of fetuses, was asked what he would do
if his daughter, when grown up, chose an abortion, even if he counselled her
against it. He replied: "I'd support my daughter., 244 The foregoing
suggests the wisdom of leaving the choice to the particular woman who can
best judge her own circumstances.
Feminist argument that would invoke "responsibility talk"24 5 encounters difficulties when used in the context of pregnancy, abortion, and
motherhood. Contemporary social and political rhetoric about responsibility
and irresponsibility offers a range of contradictory messages about when
pregnancy, abortion, and motherhood are desirable or responsible.246
While such contradictory messages may offer feminists a fulcrum by which
to demonstrate the poverty of such notions as "promoting childbirth" absent
a broader governmental commitment to reproductive health and to families,
these messages nonetheless counsel caution about responsibility talk.
Responsibility-based arguments are especially troubling in the context
of state regulation of pregnant women and single mothers.24 7 Unmarried
mothers generally (even Murphy Brown!) and, more particularly, those
receiving public assistance for their children are sometimes vilified for
creating the socioeconomic problems that other citizens face and for
seek to prevent other women from making the same mistake. See Colker, Feminist
Litigation, supra note 16, at 170-72.
243

See Petchesky, supra note 82, at 369-79; see also Gilligan, supra note 152, at

64-105, 125.
244 N.Y. Times, July 23, 1992, at A 12 (citing statements Quayle made on Larry King

Live, July 22, 1992). Both Dan and Marilyn Quayle followed up by assuring the public
that if their daughter, now 13, became pregnant while a minor, they would insist that
she carry the pregnancy to term. See Kevin Sack, Quayle Insists Abortion Remarks
Don't Signal Change in His View, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1992, at Al.
245

Cf. Glendon, supra note 19.

Again, this awaits elaboration elsewhere. See McClain, supra note 20.
As Dorothy Roberts argues, in the case of criminal prosecution of drug-addicted
mothers, it is particularly unlikely that painting such mothers as the locus of the best
decision making will carry the day; instead, Roberts argues against such prosecution by
invoking a strong right to privacy as autonomy, understood as the right to choose to
procreate, along with arguments based on racial equality. Roberts, supra note 91, at
1471-72.
246

247
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behaving irresponsibly, or even for having the children in order to collect
the additional government benefits. Hence, social welfare reform is often
targeted to eliminate such alleged incentives for unwed motherhood and to
encourage responsibility.2 4 Yet if women seek to terminate a pregnancy
because they "can't afford baby now" (a reason given by some sixty-eight
percent of women in a study of women's abortion decisions),249 accounts
of public opinion polls suggest that a majority disapproves of abortion for
financial reasons. Apparently, it is in the public interest that poor,
unmarried pregnant women bear and raise children, yet the public does not
wish to support such women and children and seeks to discourage sexual
activity, conception, and childbirth in such circumstances.25
Akin to Colker, West calls upon society to recognize "societal failures"
that lead to many unwanted pregnancies and abortions and to accept a
collective responsibility for them. 25 ' Such a call becomes particularly
relevant in light of Casey and the wave of state legislation that would
inform pregnant women about help available to them if they choose to
continue their pregnancies. One might interpret such legislation as taking
up the "collective responsibility" West charges society must accept, but
query whether such state help really does enough for women or can possibly
resolve the "irreconcilable responsibilities" that West claims pregnant
women seeking abortion face or assist in the work of, or mitigate the costs
of, motherhood.2 52
The questions raised above suggest that focusing solely on the moral
248 Such themes were prominent in the 1992 Presidential campaign and in state
social welfare reform. On the treatment of single mothers as pathological and a cause
of crime and poverty, see Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses,
1991 Duke L.J. 274 (1991); Roberts, supra note 91, at 1444.
249 See Torres & Forrest, supra note 230, at 170.
250 With respect to African-American women, Dorothy Roberts argues that due to
the legacy of slavery, they have been devalued both as victims of forced motherhood as
well as of forced sterilization. Roberts, supra note 91, at 1436-44.
251 West, supra note 17, at 85; see also Williams, supra note 226, at 1595 (arguing
work-family context more appropriate forum than abortion debate for attacking societal
constraints on women's choices).
252 In Casey, the petitioners made the argument that availability of government
medical assistance and paternal child support in theory often does not translate into
practice. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 9, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902). As Reva Siegel suggests,
"[I]nstead of devising new ways to control women as mothers, [society] needs to
promote the welfare of future generations by means that respect and support women in
their work as mothers." Siegel, supra note 27, at 381. Siegel stresses that abortion

restrictions would compel pregnancy and motherhood while "failing to mitigate or offset
the social consequences" through compensation, childcare, protection of employment,
or educational opportunities, or by forcing men to assume responsibility for the
nurturance and maintenance women typically provide. See id. at 377.
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quality of reproductive decisions or on women's "interconnected responsibilities" would not better secure reproductive freedom than does a focus on
the importance of self-determination. Although West urges that we take
responsibilities seriously, taking rights seriously may require insulation of
the right holder if the right is to survive. Engaging in public justification
does not guarantee success in persuading others and thus ensure recognition
or protection of rights deemed fundamental. West's claim that, under liberal
legalism, the moral worth of the act protected by rights does not matter fails
to specify the perspective from which moral worth is assessed. The locus
of the decision should remain the woman: as the privacy jurisprudence
discussed above recognizes, "people must be allowed to make these
decisions for themselves, consulting their own conscience, rather than
'
allowing society to thrust its collective decision on them."253
On this
point, Casey rings true: recognizing disagreement among "men and women
of good conscience" about abortion, and even that certain members of the
Court find abortion morally offensive, the Court concludes: "Our obligation
254
is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.
Removal of rights from the political agenda and the "vicissitudes" of
changing political majorities 255 helps to ensure autonomy in the sense of
self-determination.
Obviously, the twenty years since Roe demonstrate that abortion has
not been removed from the political arena; indeed, this Article began by
suggesting that Casey highlights the importance of the outcome of elections.
Yet the underlying appeal of some version of the allocation of decisionmaking authority to the individual rather than the state (and democratic
majorities) continues to hold sway, as is perhaps evident from the citation
of Barnette in the Casey joint opinion.256 In this regard, it is telling that,
when asked about their own granddaughters or daughters, neither President
Bush nor Vice President Quayle responded as they should have, were they
to adhere to their stated positions on abortion and their party platform, by
saying something like: "If I am successful in implementing my agenda on
this issue, she will not be able to make that choice because I will make
253

Dworkin, supra note 33, at 49, 50.

254 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2803.
5'5See West Va. Bd. of Educ.

v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 204-05 (1977). Of course, Roe acknowledged some
realm of permissible state regulation. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973).
Webster stressed drawing the line between what about abortion was properly removed
from public debate and what was not, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.

490, 520-21 (1989), in an opinion read by many as opening the door to increased state
regulation. See id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Casey would appear to draw

the line differently from both Roe and Webster.
256 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2807.
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abortion illegal except in limited circumstances." Instead, President Bush
wondered aloud, "well, whose else's-who else's [decision] could it
'
be?"257
In the face of a party platform recognizing no exceptions to its
opposition to legal abortion, First Lady Barbara Bush at last publicly
expressed her view that abortion was a "personal thing" that has no place
in political platforms.2" 8
Furthermore, even if women must increasingly turn to legislatures to
preserve reproductive freedom (as they have in fact done subsequent to
Webster and Casey), arguments based on self-determination and on women
as the proper locus of decision making are more likely to preserve women's
reproductive freedom. 5 9 The Freedom of Choice Act, now before
Congress, offers pre-viability protection of women's reproductive decisions,
with no reference to the reasons women proffer for such decisions.
Similarly, several proposed or already successful state initiatives to codify
Roe, either through state legislation or constitutional amendment, declare
women's decisional autonomy prior to viability pure and simple.260

IV. CONCLUSION
As Nancy Steams and others active in early reproductive freedom
efforts recount, pro-choice litigants sought "to influence the law by
dramatizing women's experiences with abortion" and the stories and
circumstances of women found their way into judicial opinions, including
Roe itself, when the Court spoke of the distress created by unwanted
pregnancy 6 ' As the most recent example, the Casey opinion reflects such
257 Excerpts from an Interview with President Bush, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1992, at
A15.
258 See Alessandra Stanley, First Lady on Abortion: Not a Platform Issue, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 14, 1992, at Al.
259 See Tribe, supra note 35, at 172-91 (describing NARAL's public education
campaign in anticipation of Webster, organized around effective message, "Who
decides?," and galvanizing impact of Websterdecision on pro-choice movement's efforts
in political arena, organized around successful theme that voting for any abortion
restriction threatened women's right to choose whether to terminate pregnancy).
260 See NARAL, supra note 205, at 16, 52, 130. In 1990, Connecticut enacted such
a legislative declaration. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-602 (West Supp. 1992).
Washington's Reproductive Privacy Act, Initiative 120, §§ 1-2, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
tit. 9, ch. 9.02 (West Supp. 1992) (codified preceding § 9.02.005 pending assignment
of section number), successfully passed by popular vote on November 5, 1991.
Maryland's codification of Roe, Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 20-209 (Supp. 1992),
was approved by a two-to-one margin by the state's voters in a November 1992
referendum. See Robert Reinhold, The Ballot Issues: Five States Adopt Term Limits
for Members of Congress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1992, at B8.
261 Nancy Steams, who authored the amicuscuriaebrief submitted on behalf of New
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efforts with its references to the link between reproductive freedom and the
full participation in social, political, and economic arenas of the women who
have come of age since 1973.262
Arguments premised on self-determination and bodily integrity,
associated with the right of privacy, should continue to play a central role
in defending and protecting women's right to choose to continue or to
terminate their pregnancies. While a bald appeal to bodily integrity
alone--e.g., "keep your laws off my body"-may not go far enough to
establish the case for such a right, going down the path of responsibility and
"women who would be mothers but for circumstances and constraints" is
not, by itself, a better alternative. Such rhetoric will trigger too much
second-guessing of women's decisions, without triggering adequate societal
or governmental commitment to reproductive health and to families. At the
same time, it will also leave women vulnerable to charges of irresponsibility.
Even the most compelling cases of constraint will still be found by some
abortion opponents to be instances of mere "convenience., 263 As argued
above, the unfolding political and social debates over responsibility and
irresponsibility indicate that women face a number of double binds with
respect to reproductive choices.
In contrast, I believe Casey's articulation of liberty demonstrates the
continuing appeal of arguments protecting self-determination by reference
not only to the bodily integrity of women but also to the profound and
personal nature of assessing the meaning of reproduction in the lives of
particular women. Privacy rhetoric need not be silent about the circumstances of women's lives. From the beginning of reproductive freedom
litigation, women's stories were a part of the education and litigation
process.
Many feminists writing about and working to protect reproductive
freedom stress the need to place abortion in the context of a broader
reproductive health agenda. There is some exploration of common ground
between women on both sides of the abortion issue, particularly common
ground with respect to addressing circumstances and constraints making
Women Lawyers in Roe, made this observation in her keynote address at the Workshop.
See also Nancy Steams, Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 Berkeley Women's
L.J. 1, 4-5 (1989); Schneider, supra note 57, at 995-97 (arguing that the concurrence
of Justice Douglas in Roe "directly responded to the range of arguments presented in
feminist briefs in Roe").
262 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
263
See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text. In addition, in my own
experience in discussing the right to abortion with colleagues, students, and friends, no
matter how forcefully someone articulates responsibility arguments, persons morally

opposed to abortion invariably reduce these arguments to matters of mere "convenience."
Self-determination and toleration arguments usually fare better with such persons.
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pregnancy unwanted. Yet there will undoubtedly be some stark differences
as to solutions, disagreements on issues like the need for access to
contraception and sex education, particularly for teens, like the desirability
of the patriarchal family and its division of labor between mother and father,
and like the appropriateness of sexual activity outside of marriage.
Nevertheless, feminists should seek to influence the debate over what
it means to say that a state has an interest in protecting potential life and a
preference for childbirth, regardless of the choices and circumstances of
particular pregnant women. Arguments premised in decisional autonomy,
in the connection between reproductive choice and self-determination and
identity, should influence that debate. Perhaps we are entering a new
political climate in which a focus on reproductive health and genuine
support for persons who choose to become parents may be possible. One
can aspire to eliminate the need for abortion and to eliminate constraint
while nonetheless defending the constitutional liberty embodied in the right
of privacy.

